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ABSTRACT 
 
    In this thesis we use tereke records of Manisa and Kayseri, and compare wealth 
distributions between 1700-1720 and 1780-1800 periods. We first checked whether rise 
in wealth of non-Muslims was more significant than of Muslims in both cities. We 
found that in Manisa, as is expected because it had strong commercial relationship with 
Europe, non-Muslims economically improved more than Muslims. However, a rapid 
economic decline of non-Muslims is observed in Kayseri. Then we tried to examine 
commercial activities of Muslims and non-Muslims through commercial properties in 
the tereke records. We observed that commercial activities of non-Muslims also 
expanded in comparison with commercial activities of Muslims in Manisa, and 
commercial activities of non-Muslims reduced in Kayseri. Therefore we rejected the 
claim that there was a general ascendance of non-Muslims in the 18th century. Non-
Muslims seem to develop only in regions which had strong commercial relationship 
with Europe, but in regions like Kayseri, where domestic trade was strong, both general 
wealth level and vitality of commercial activities of non-Muslims left behind Muslims.  
 
Keywords: Manisa, Kayseri, tereke, non-Muslim, Muslim, wealth, Ottoman Empire, 
18th Century, trade, ethnic division of labor 
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ÖZET 
   
    Bu tezde, Manisa ve Kayseri tereke kayıtlarından faydalanarak, 1700-1720 ve 1780-
1800 periodları arasındaki servet dağılımlarını karşılaştırdık. Öncelikle 
Gayrimüslimlerin servetlerindeki artışın her iki şehirde de Müslümanların servetindeki 
artıştan fazla olup olmadığını kontrol ettik. Manisa’da, bu şehrin Avrupa ile ticari 
ilişkilerinden ötürü beklendiği gibi, Gayrimüslimlerin, Müslümanlardan daha hızlı 
servet biriktirdiğini gördük. Ancak Kayseri’de Gayrimüslimlerin hızlı bir ekonomik 
gerileme içine girdiği gözlendi. Ardından tereke kayıtlarındaki ticari emtialar üzerinden 
ticari faaliyetleri incelemeye çalıştık. Manisa’da Gayrimüslimlerin ticari faaliyetlerinin 
de Müslümanlara nazaran geliştiğini, ancak Kayseri’de bu alanda da, Gayrimüslimler 
için, bir gerilemeden bahsedilebileceğini gördük. Bu durumda 18. Yüzyılda genel bir 
Gayrimüslim ekonomik yükselişi olduğu iddiasını redetmek durumunda kaldık. 
Gayrimüslimler sadece Avrupa ile ekonomik ilişkilerin güçlü olduğu bölgelerde 
ekonomik gelişim gösterirken, yerel ve bölgesel ticaretin hakim olduğu Kayseri gibi 
bölgelerde hem genel servet düzeyi itibari ile, hem de ticari faaliyetlerinin canlılığı 
itibari ile Müslümanların gerisine düşmüş görünmektedirler.    
 
Anahtar Sözcükler: Manisa, Kayseri, tereke, Gayrimüslim, Müslüman, servet, 
Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, 18. yüzyıl, ticaret, etnik işbölümü 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
According to most historical accounts of the Ottoman Empire, non-Muslim 
Ottomans occupied a pivotal position within the 18th-century networks of trade and 
commerce with European countries. Because it is often accepted that commercial 
relations between the Ottoman Empire and the West improved in the 18th century, these 
accounts provide a basis for the claim that the economic situation of the non-Muslims 
improved in this period. One of the most controversial theses in Ottoman 
historiography, which indeed supports this claim, is the “ethnic division of labor” thesis, 
based mainly on a 1917 article by Sussnitzki. According to this thesis, the empire’s 
trade belonged to non-Muslims, while Muslims concentrated mainly on agriculture and 
bureaucracy. If this is true, a natural result of the expansion of trade in the 18th century 
would have been a significant economic improvement for non-Muslims relative to 
Muslims. However, certain studies have shown that Muslims were not only active but 
even dominant in domestic trade and international trade with the countries to the east, 
and some studies also show that domestic trade and foreign trade towards the east 
improved, just as European trade did, in the same period. On this basis it would be 
expected that the economic rise of Muslims would have been steeper than that of non-
Muslims in those regions where domestic and/or eastern markets were main targets of 
trade, with the opposite holding true for regions under the influence of European trade. 
In the present analysis, we attempt to compare the wealth dynamics of Muslims 
and non-Muslims in two cities, Manisa and Kayseri. Neither of these cities seems to 
have been a trade hub in the 18th century, but both were commercially important. Both 
cities had had settled non-Muslim communities for a long time, which allows us to 
make relevant comparisons between Muslims and non-Muslims.1 Manisa is a close 
hinterland of Izmir, one of the empire’s most important export points, and in the 18th 
century the distance between them would have taken ten to fifteen hours to traverse 
(Nagata, 1997, p. 17). It thus seems plausible to surmise that it had a close commercial 
relationship with Europe; but we cannot claim the same for Kayseri. According to 
                                                          
1 We are not claiming that the population was stable. There was always migration, by all 
groups, both in and out, as will be shown in detail in Section 4. What we mean is that in 
both cities, and for a long time, all religious groups (mainly Muslim, Armenian, Greek, 
and Jewish) had communities structured around their temples. Hence, we can compare 
the religious groups while bearing in mind the possible biases that may result from 
migration. 
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Faroqhi (1987), Kayseri’s international trade was not very significant in the 18th 
century; yet various secondary trade routes did connect it with other commercial hubs, 
thus supporting the city’s domestic trade (p. 42). Therefore, on the basis of the 
preceding considerations, we may expect to observe more significant economic 
improvements for non-Muslims than for Muslims in Manisa, and the opposite in 
Kayseri. 
Our unit of comparison is individual wealth as counted after the death of the 
individual. In the Ottoman Empire, after a death, and if the involvement of the 
government was needed for the distribution of inheritance of the deceased, a record of 
the case was kept as a tereke record in the kadı sicili.2 In each tereke, the identity3 of the 
deceased was recorded, along with a detailed list of the items s/he left, often with their 
value. Unfortunately, though, these records have significant limitations. Women, rural 
populations, and non-Muslims are generally underrepresented. We do not possess 
information about the age of the deceased, but elders were probably overrepresented, as 
were the rich; and because of the nature of these records, those who died without 
leaving any inheritance (in terms of gross wealth) are also absent. In many studies based 
on probate inventories,4 some of these problems are resolved by appealing to 
demographic data from secondary sources. In the present analysis, however, we do not 
use any secondary data, but rather we frame our conclusions while keeping in mind the 
possible magnitudes and directions of the biases induced by the data set. Another set of 
problems related to these records concerns the values of estates. To get a higher fee, 
court officials may have tried to record higher values than the market prices. In 
addition, heirs may well have hidden parts of their inheritance in order to escape tax. 
However, although this second set of problems could be misleading for static analyses 
                                                          
2 Kadı Sicili: Registers of the kadı (Islamic judge) in which all the judicial, 
administrative, and municipal judgments and decisions are recorded. 
3 His/her name, name of his/her father, title if s/he had one, often the religion (Muslim, 
Christian, or Jew), region (urban or rural), and sometimes the family name and 
occupation are recorded. Rarely do we get more detailed information about the identity 
of the deceased. 
4 The probate inventory is the European and American counterpart of the tereke records. 
They share many aspects, including the limitations, of tereke records, and are widely 
utilized in wealth studies on Western nations. In Ottoman studies this term is sometimes 
used instead of tereke. Therefore, when we need to refer to both the Western and the 
Ottoman inheritance records we use the term “probate inventories.” 
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of a particular group at a given time, there is no reason to think that these trends would 
have changed across time and across the various religious groups. 
We utilized the tereke records obtained by Hulya Canbakal, who collected them 
for her project “Distribution of Wealth in the Ottoman Empire, 1500-1840”.5 She 
collected the records in twenty-year periods, which allowed her to draw together a 
meaningful sample size. In our analysis we compared two periods, 1700-1720 and 
1780-1800. But these periods are not representative simply of conditions that obtained 
during the twenty years they cover. Because all records were kept after the individual’s 
death, and since a significant proportion of the individuals recorded were probably 
economically active for some years before their death, the values in our sets illuminate 
the economic developments of some years before beginning of the period. 
The main question here is whether a religion-based wealth polarization occurred 
in the empire in the 18th century. One of the most crucial problems in comparing these 
two religious groups is the implicit acceptance of both groups as concrete entities. There 
are studies which set out the economic development of particular subgroups or 
invididuals within non-Muslim confessional groups. Clogg (1982) and Barsoumian 
(1982) discuss the differences within the Greek and Armenian millets. Barsoumian 
focuses on the amira class of Armenians and shows how they were differentiated from 
other Armenians. Clogg shows that there were great differences among the nations 
constituting the millet-i Rum. He claims that the Greeks rose significantly compared to 
other ethnic groups, and suggests that the revolts of the Balkan nations in the 19th 
century were not only against the Ottoman government but also against the Greeks. 
Because our sets were already very small, we did not attempt to divide non-Muslims 
into smaller subsets.6 However, we analyzed changes in intra-group inequalities, and 
checked if wealth was concentrated in the hands of a small group of non-Muslims, 
without concentrating on their ethnicity or church. 
Similar concerns can also be raised for Muslims. Having a relationship with the 
government was among the most important sources of wealth in the Ottoman Empire 
before the 18th century, but we do not know if it remained so afterwards. Our sample 
                                                          
5 TUBİTAK Research Project No. 108K034.  
6 Because they are often recorded as either “Christians” or Jews, we can differentiate 
subgroups of  Christians only through names, but this is not a very secure method. 
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sizes for Muslims are often large enough to divide in subgroups. As is mentioned above, 
sometimes the titles of the deceased are recorded in tereke. Based on these titles, we 
also tried to observe if having a relationship with the state continued to be an important 
source of capital accumulation. 
As is well known, Ottoman society consisted of two groups, reaya7 and askeri. 
The former was the productive class of peasants, merchants, and artisans. The latter 
constituted the ruling stratum of the empire before the 17th century and consisted of 
military commanders, administrators, and ilmiyye8 (Somel, 2003, p. 189). This class was 
tax-exempt, although not always9 and not necessarily from all taxes.  
After the 17th century the borders between reaya and askeri became blurred. The 
main reason for these vanishing borders was the economic activities of soldiers who 
began to maintain garrisons in important cities in the second half of the 16th century 
(Inalcık, 1980; Karababa, 2012a).10  They began entering guilds and getting higher 
posts. There was also a movement from the opposite side. Ordinary men were able to 
buy janissary pay tickets and gain income and tax-exemption (Findley, 2006). 
According to Pamuk (2009) this merging of local populations and janissaries was 
among the most significant trends of the 18th century.  
Because the advantages of those who had military titles continued, independent 
from their productive activities, askeri could still form an economically distinct 
subgroup.11 According to Barkey (2008), ulema (members of the ilmiyye) were gaining 
                                                          
7 This distinction is problematic, especially for our purposes. In the 18th century, the 
term reaya increasingly applied to only non-Muslims (Kunt, 2005, p. 204; Somel, 2003, 
p. 239). Hence we preferred non-askeri, askeri, and non-Muslim as categories in our 
analysis. However, we continue to use reaya when we cite the literature. 
8 The ilmiyye was the class of government officials responsible for religion, justice, 
jurisprudence, and medrese education (Somel, 2003, p. 129). 
9 In some instances in the 18th century they also paid taxes. For example in 1795, under 
the İrad-ı Cedid Treasury, everyone was held responsible for tax (Anastasopoulos, 
2007). 
10 There is considerable literature on the blurred lines between the askeri and reaya. 
Many of the “Mirrors for Princes” authors of the 17th century mentioned the vanishing 
lines as among the reasons for the loss of the empire’s previous glory. 
11 As mentioned by Canbakal (2007; 2012), this group consisted of different subgroups 
including ilmiyye and seyfiyye (as well as kalemiyye (bureaucracy), and other palace 
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power in the 18th century, consolidating their social and religious bases and reinforcing 
their own corporate-institutional structure (p. 210). It might well be expected that this 
gain in power would be reflected in economic terms. Besides, in the 18th century askeri 
could find various ways to escape from confiscations, and so protect their wealth 
(Salzmann, 1993). Titular inheritance could be another source of divergence of askeri 
from non-askeri; according to a decree in 1605 (Canbakal 2007, p. 65) children of 
askeri were also accepted as askeri. As well as this there was a process of 
“sadatization”; many Muslims claimed to be seyyids,12 and so became askeri/tax exempt 
(Canbakal, 2005). This trend also shows the possible economic returns associated with 
this title. 
It was more difficult for non-Muslims to obtain an askeri-related title. In our 
data set there are no non-Muslim askeri: therefore, this askeri–reaya separation divides 
the Muslim set alone. This means that if a relationship with the government really had 
economic value, inclusion of them in analysis would cause bias. 
Therefore, because of the possibility of a positive effect of status on the wealth 
of Muslims, we separated askeri from reaya through titles and occupations.13 However, 
this separation may be less reliable than onomastics for non-Muslims. In all likelihood, 
all askeri people had honorary titles, but not all such titles mean they had a relation with 
the government. For example, Gradeva (2005) mentions İbrahim Çelebi, kethüda 
(chamberlain) of İsmail Ağa in Sofia in the late 17th century (p. 185). This İbrahim 
Çelebi was probably not a member of the ilmiyye. However, if he was in our set, we 
would accept him as askeri because he was a çelebi. So, when we separate askeri and 
non-askeri we only clean non-askeri from the askeri, while also dropping some non-
askeri from the set. 
Therefore, we do not claim absolute separation of askeri and non-askeri as two 
distinct categories. First, we always compare non-Muslims with whole set of Muslims; 
then, we focus on askeri just to guard against possible bias resulting from their 
inclusion. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
figures who were not related with our two cities in the 18th century). Therefore it could 
also be segmented in itself. 
12 An honorific title for the descendants of the Prophet. 
13 For titles and occupational classification, see Appendix A. 
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During our analysis we first focused on the two cities as whole. It is often 
accepted that the period of approximately half a century after the devastating war 
against Russia (1768-1774) was a time of crisis in the Ottoman Empire. However, we 
observe a growth in terms of wealth in both cities in the 18th century, probably because 
our 1780-1800 set is not exclusively representative of the post-war period, but also of 
the wealth accumulation process before the war. 
In the next step, we then ask how the wealth of Muslims and non-Muslims 
changed. In Manisa, the wealth of non-Muslims increased in the 18th century more than 
that of Muslims. While at the beginning non-Muslims and non-askeri Muslims had 
similar wealth levels, at the end of the century non-Muslims had more wealth. However, 
we cannot claim that they had more wealth than askeri at the end of the century. 
In the third step we look at commercial activities and observe that the share of 
non-Muslims in commercial activities increased in Manisa. However, in Kayseri the 
share of Muslims in commercial activities increased, but that of non-Muslims 
decreased. Then we added the size of commercial activities to our analysis. In Manisa, 
the wealth of non-Muslims seems, like the general wealth level, to have increased more 
than that of Muslims. In Kayseri, the opposite is true. 
In brief, one of the most important conclusions to be drawn from this analysis is 
that it is wrong to generalize a development in one region of the empire for all regions. 
As is expected, in Manisa the rise of the wealth of non-Muslims was more significant 
than that of the Muslims, while the opposite was the case in Kayseri. One of the 
possible explanations for this condition is the effect of European trade and the pivotal 
position of non-Muslims in this trade in Manisa, while Kayseri focused mainly on 
domestic trade, this being a sector where Muslims were more active than non-Muslims. 
Our thesis proceeds as follows. The second section, a literature review, covers 
the studies which focus on particular religious groups, or which try to compare them, 
mainly for the 18th century. The third section is an overview of the 18th century. In this 
section we focus only on certain administrative, fiscal, and economic changes in the 18th 
century which could affect our population. In the fourth section we introduce Manisa 
and Kayseri in detail. In the fifth section we introduce our data set, focusing on its 
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limitations and the ways these limitations may affect our conclusions. Then, in the sixth 
section, we examine our data and draw our conclusion. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In Ottoman historiography it is often accepted that non-Muslims were 
economically better off than Muslims in almost all sectors and in almost all regions, 
during the last century of the empire. Marouche and Sarantis show that in 1912 almost 
half of the Ottoman bankers were Greek while only two of the identifiable 130 bankers 
were Turkish14 (cited in Issawi, 1998, p. 104). According to Tevfik Çavdar, in 1913 
Turks had only a 15% share in industrial firms employing more than four workers and 
five-sixths of the remainder belonged to Ottoman non-Muslims (cited in Issawi, 1998, 
p. 105). Frangakis-Syrett (1999) claims that in the beginning of the 19th century around 
50% of commerce of Izmir was in the hands of the Greeks (p. 19), and according to 
Kasaba (1988a), in the mid-19th century, the economic power of the non-Muslim 
merchants and bankers of Western Anatolia was so great that the Muslims potentates 
were dependent on the non-Muslims (p. 102). 
Since Sussnitzki’s article of 1917, a thesis has existed that there was an “ethnic 
division of labor” in the empire, which generalizes the mentioned conditions in the 19th 
century along with the records of Western travelers, councils, and merchants across 
periods and regions, and broadly claims that non-Muslims economically dominated 
profitable sectors while Muslims concentrated on bureaucracy, in some industries such 
as  tanning and carpet weaving, and subsistence agriculture. According to Sussnitzki 
(1966), there was no great difference between Muslims15 and non-Muslims in 
agriculture and industry. “But trade is characterized by a very significant absence of the 
largest of the Turkish ethnic groups” (p. 120). This sector was almost completely 
dominated by Greeks and Armenians. He claims that the possible reasons for this 
dominance were their networks across cities and country, and the protection they 
obtained from foreign powers (pp. 120-121). Lewis (1968), going further, points out 
that “the Ottoman Muslims knew only four professions—government, war, religion, and 
agriculture. Industry and trade were left in large measure to the non-Muslim subjects” 
(p. 35). He points to a lack of interest on the part of Muslims, and moreover the 
suspicions on the part of jurists, regarding traveling into the lands of non-Muslims, as a 
                                                          
14 In this context, an Ottoman Muslim. 
15 He uses the term “Turk” not “Muslim,” and mentions other nationalities, which were 
predominantly Muslim (i.e. Kurds, Arabs), separately. However they displayed no great 
differences among themselves. 
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reason for the absence of Muslims in the international trade with Europe (2002, pp. 35-
37). Grenet (2011) interprets the non-existence of Muslim traders in the European 
sources as a sign of the predominance of Ottoman non-Muslims in the Levantine trade, 
and according to Issawi (1982) the reason for the one-sided application of the 
Capitulations, which were on paper reciprocal, was that very few Muslims traveled to 
Europe for trade, and the ones who did were ineffective (p. 18). 
Some more nuanced assertions related to the “ethnic division of labor” thesis 
emphasize not the absence of Muslims in commercial activities but the concentration of 
non-Muslims in certain, and mainly more profitable, sectors. According to Issawi 
(1998), Jews were dominant in banking, minting, and foreign trade due to their foreign 
contacts. They also adjusted to cash-cropping more quickly when commercial 
agricultural improved. Ginio (2000) claims that in Thessaloniki, brokers, loaners, 
money-exchangers, translators, and intermediaries between local traders and the 
Europeans were local non-Muslims. Goffman (2002) points out that most pastoralists 
were Muslim while Greeks were mariners, Armenians dominated international trade and 
brokerage, and textile manufacturers often were Jewish (p. 85). According to him, the 
reason for this situation was the specialization of certain ethno-religious groups in 
certain professions in which they had gained relative advantages centuries ago. Before 
the Turks entered Anatolia, Greeks were already mariners while immigrant Jews were 
good textile manufacturers, and they continued to dominate these sectors. 
In some recent studies the “ethnic/religious division of labor” thesis is being 
questioned. Kabadayı (2009) points out that religion was not among the determinants of 
wages in the Imperial Fez Factory in the last quarter of the 19th century, and in the case 
of employment, probably for military/political reasons, male Orthodox Christians were 
not favored after the independence of the Greek State. But for Armenians and female 
Orthodox Christians we do not observe the same restrictions, and there is no manifest or 
significant inclination to employ members of specific certain religious community. In 
his analysis of approximately 7,500 people and 2,000 shops in early nineteenth-century 
Istanbul, Kırlı (2001) shows that Muslims were far from “humble rural labor” and that 
not only ethno-religious but also regional allegiances were effective in occupational 
specialization, along with other possible factors. Although we cannot observe a 
correlation in his analysis between the size and profitability of firms and type of 
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religion, and there are some sectors in which people from all confessional groups 
existed together, while the idea that some ethno-religious groups specialized in some 
particular sectors is not rejected (i.e. groceries and gardens were in the hands of Greeks; 
bakeries, mills, and pottery shops were dominated by Armenians; and bathhouses were 
managed by Muslims). Quataert (2004) also rejects the ethnic division of labor thesis as 
“an inaccurate stereotype”. However, like Kırlı, he does not deny that in particular 
regions of the empire certain ethno-religious groups dominated certain sectors. His 
objection is directed against attempts to generalize this situation for all industries in the 
empire as a whole (p. 14). 
Some of the claims based on the “ethnic division of labor” thesis can be 
accepted in some measure for the last century of the empire, while their validity for 
previous centuries remains questionable. There are signs of Muslim dominance in some 
sectors, including trade, in some regions, at least until the last decades of the 18th 
century. Jennings (1973) shows that credit relationships in Kayseri in the first quarter of 
the 17th century were dominated by Muslims, not by non-Muslims. In the Black Sea 
wheat trade, Muslims seem to have remained dominant until the end of the 18th century 
(Panzac, 1992). Even in Thessaloniki in the 18th century Muslims were not completely 
absent from commercial activities. Ginio (2000) refers to the Muslim coffee merchants 
of Thessaloniki who were busy in their trade with Egypt. In Sarajevo, the majority of 
the merchants in the 17th century were Muslim (Koller, 2008).16 According to Greene 
(2000), Muslim merchants (though many of them seem to be recent converts after the 
conquest of 1669) were dominant in commerce of Crete, and their dominance continued 
until the last decades of 18th century (ch. 5). Pedani (2008) claims that Muslim traders 
were active in Venice and Ancona until the mid-17th century. The foundation of the 
second Fondaco dei Turchei (Turkish inn) in 1636 shows increasing activity in Venice 
in the first half of the 17th century. However, Pedani also claims that this activity halted 
after 1720s. 
                                                          
16 But we ought also to know the ratio of non-Muslims in Sarajevo. Stoianovich (1960) 
claims that, although their number was increasing, there was only a small number of 
non-Muslims in Sarajevo in the 17th century. 
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Despite the continued Muslim activity in trade, this was not very significant in 
international trade with the West.17 Gilbar (2005) shows that even in the 19th century 
there were Muslim great tüccar (merchants) with significant networks. But these 
networks encompassed the Nile Valley, the Red Sea basin, the Levant and North Africa, 
the Thessaloniki-Egypt line and the Black Sea. The main European country with which 
they had commercial relations was Venice, and this was declining in the 18th century (it 
collapsed in 1797) while other European countries were gaining prominence. Also in 
Crete, when the Muslims became increasingly active in trade, the share of Egypt and 
other predominantly Muslim regions also increased in the total trade of the island 
(Greene, 2000, ch.5). 
The static version of the ethnic division of labor thesis, which tends to generalize 
the relative economic conditions of Muslims and non-Muslims across time and regions, 
therefore seems misleading. But claims about a more active role for non-Muslims in the 
European trade, and their economic rise due to the European effect, have not to our 
knowledge been falsified.18 There is a broad literature about the reasons for the 
economic ascendance of non-Muslims in comparison with Muslims, induced by the 
European trade, and especially for the 18th and 19th centuries. Protection from 
Europeans, the networks of non-Muslims all over the world and the empire, and the rise 
of naval activities by non-Muslims, are counted among the reasons for their economic 
ascendance. During the 18th century, non-Muslims obtained berat19 in increasing 
numbers. These berat not only reduced their taxes, because of the Capitulations, but 
also allowed them to choose more efficient institutions (Kuran, 2004). However, 
                                                          
17 As will be shown in Section 3, trade with Europe was not very significant, but for the 
claim about the ascendance of the non-Muslim Ottomans it is important. 
18 We do not mean that there was no ascendance at all before the 18th century. 
According to Stoianovich (1960), trade in the Balkans had been developing for 
approximately three centuries before the 18th. The process of the incorporation of the 
Ottoman Empire into the capitalist world economy had begun in the 16th century and 
commercial relationships with Europe had been improving since then (Çizakça, 1985). 
Besides this, Kasaba (1988b) claims that the intermediary role of the non-Muslims 
between the Europeans and the locals was not a reason for their ascendance but rather a 
result of the economic power they gained before the Europeans entered the region. 
What we claim is that the literature points to a rise (and a more rapid rise than before) of 
non-Muslims in comparison with Muslims in the 18th century. 
19 A berat was a patent which provided its owner with access to the legislation of the 
country which had issued it. Ottoman legal pluralism, which was based on Islamic law, 
offered such an option for non-Muslims. 
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Çizakça and Kenanoğlu (2008) claim, based on Boogert, that in the 18th century the 
number of beratlı20 did not show any marked increase. As well as this, they reject 
Kuran, and claim that the European institutions were not much more efficient than the 
Ottoman ones.21  
Another possible reason for a positive effect by the Europeans on Ottoman non-
Muslims was the latter’s networks, which have been mentioned by a great number of 
scholars who have worked on non-Muslim merchants. Braude (2000, p. 410) mentions 
that there was an “ethnic division of trade” and “ethnic trading networks” in Buda. 
Although he describes a lending–borrowing relationship between a Muslim and a 
Christian, Ginio (2000) also refers to co-religious networks (pp. 75-76). According to 
Issawi (1998), the Greek Diaspora helped their kin in the empire. He also emphasizes 
the clannishness of non-Muslims. According to Seirinidou (2008) their extensive family 
and kin networks helped the Greeks to settle in the Habsburg Empire. Faroqhi (1997) 
generalizes the case and claims that minorities in the pre-Industrial Era were usually 
engaged in creating an economy based on co-religious solidarity and trust, and Ottoman 
non-Muslims thus improved themselves through such ties. 
As well as these factors, the maritime activities of the Greeks had been 
increasing since the beginning of the 18th century (Papakonstantinaou, 2010). After the 
period of wars and revolutions began in Europe, Greek merchant marines enhanced 
their position in the Aegean Sea.  
In conclusion, according to the literature it is to be expected that non-Muslims 
improved their economic situation more than Muslims did, in the 18th century in the 
regions open to the European trade, especially around the Aegean shores. However, 
because the role of non-Muslims was not very significant in domestic trade, and 
domestic trade increased as well in this century, the rise of Muslims as well as non-
Muslims is to be expected in the inner regions of the empire. 
                                                          
20 Beratlı means someone who had obtained a berat. 
21 Kuran claims that the Islamic institutions were against corporations. Firms were 
dissolved after the death of a partner. Çizakça and Kenanoğlu (2008) claim that if there 
were more than two members, a firm could survive. Nevertheless, we think that the 
possibility of negative effects of Islamic law on corporations cannot be completely 
rejected. 
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3. The Ottoman Empire in the 18th Century: A Short Overview 
According to the literature, some important institutional changes occurred in the 
17th and 18th centuries, and these give this period its distinctive character (especially as 
regards the second half of the 18th century). We can combine the changes which may 
have affected wealth distribution between religious groups in Kayseri and Manisa under 
three titles; fiscal, administrative, and economic. Fiscal institutions became more 
monetized. Since the last decades of the 16th century, the tımar, one of the most crucial 
fiscal (but also administrative and military) institutions, had been declining, while 
iltizam was replacing it. In the end of the 17th century two radical changes occurred. The 
first was malikane, that namely life-time iltizam. The second was a change in they cizye 
(poll-tax from non-Muslims) system. Because only Muslims could obtain malikane, and 
under the new cizye collection system the fiscal burden of non-Muslims increased, it 
can be claimed that changes in fiscal institutions negatively affected non-Muslims in the 
provinces, at least in the beginning of the 18th century. This change also opened the way 
for administrative change in the provinces. Utilizing the new system, provincial elites 
obtained administrative authority. Although in Kayseri we do not observe the exclusive 
power of one elite family, in Manisa a dynasty arose which may have affected both the 
economic and social structures. We do not have information about the rise of provincial 
elites in Kayseri, but in Manisa it is likely that, successful or not, the rising family tried 
to suppress other Muslim families and to support non-Muslims. Therefore this change 
possibly had a positive effect on non-Muslims and increased inequality among the 
Muslims in Manisa. In the 18th century both the domestic and foreign trade of the 
empire improved. In Western Anatolia exports to Europe increased, and the traders of 
Kayseri became more active across northern and southern Anatolia. Hence, if the 
possible effect of European trade on non-Muslims is accepted, the economic 
improvement of non-Muslims in the western regions of the empire can be expected.    
Land market institutions remained among the most rigid of the Ottoman 
institutions until the mid-19th century (Pamuk, 2009). However, one of the most crucial 
changes had occurred in the land reserve system. Although the Ottomans allowed 
different systems in different regions of their vast empire, in the core regions state 
ownership of agricultural lands (miri) was the dominant form. More than three quarters 
of the agricultural lands in these regions were estimated to be miri in the first half of the 
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16th century, and until the last years of the empire the government resisted accepting 
private property rights over agricultural lands.22  
There were two systems which applied to miri lands: tımar and iltizam. Tımar 
was the core of the Ottoman military-administrative-agricultural complex in the core 
regions until the end of the 16th century (Somel, 2003, p. 299). Under this system, a unit 
of cereal-growing land (tımar) was assigned to the administration of a sipahi23 who was 
often chosen for their wartime valor. They would collect taxes of their tımar mostly 
through in-kind payment, and spending the proceeds locally. The most important 
obligation of a sipahi was to provide fully equipped mounted cavalrymen, the number 
of which depended on the size of his tımar. This system allowed the empire to have 
readily available cavalrymen in times of war, that being the second great component of 
the Ottoman army in the classical period. Sipahi also prevented rising local powers from 
posing a threat to the central authority. Another benefit of the system was the avoidance 
of transaction costs which would emerge if tax had to be collected in the center and then 
redistributed. Unlike tımar, the iltizam had no military aspect, and resembled the 
monetization of the economy. In this system a source of revenue called mukataa was 
assigned through an auction to a contractor (mültezim) to collect taxes for 1 to 3 years. 
This, we may say, functioned as a form of government borrowing without interest, the 
latter being ruled out as an Islamic institution (Pamuk, 2009).24 State enterprises like 
                                                          
22  We do not mean that lands could not be private property. Vineyards and orchards 
could be. As well as this, wasteland was accepted as the private property of the first 
person to cultivate it. Also, after the 17th century some miri lands were treated like 
private property although legally they were still state-owned. Waqf were also used to 
change miri into private property. One of the most important developments on miri 
lands (but not only on miri lands) was çiftlik (big-farm) formation. These were also 
quasi-private organizations. For more information about çiftlik and changes in land 
regimes, see İnalcık (1991a), Veinstein (1991), and Nagata (1995, pp. 83-101). 
23 They are often Muslim but non-Muslims could also have tımar. During the first three 
centuries of the empire, in some regions, especially the newly conquered lands, sipahi 
were Christian (former notables). For example, Zarinebaf (2005) shows that in 1489, 
261 of 281 sipahi in Limnos (taken peacefully in 1458) were Christian. However after 
the 17th century the non-Muslim sipahi almost disappeared. Sons of previously non-
Muslim sipahi also Islamized and remained in the ranks of the notables of their regions. 
24 This prohibition could be circumvented in many ways but as long as iltizam existed 
there was no need of an alternative. Besides, iltizam was not merely a substitute for 
interest-bearing loans. It was a widespread method of government finance in Europe, 
especially in France. Around the 1770s, as the Ferme Générale, it constituted a third of 
the ordinary budget of France (White, 1989, p. 552), and it was also combined with 
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mints and mines had been managed by this system throughout the empire in previous 
centuries. However, after the 17th century, because of changing military tactics and 
equipment,25 population pressure, the Celali rebellions and the monetary crisis, the 
tımar system gradually gave way to iltizam26 as regards agricultural revenues as well 
(Darling, 2006). 
Changing military tactics and equipment in the late 16th century, which rendered 
sipahi obsolete and increased the need for infantry troops with firearms, was one of the 
most significant processes which effected the decline of the tımar. Sipahi cavalrymen 
used traditional weapons—bows, lances, and swords. Because they proved ineffective 
(especially against the Austrian musketeers) in the late 16th century, the government 
tried to increase the number of units with firearms (Somel, 2003, p. 271-272). The 
number of the janissaries27 increased threefold in the second half of the 16th century 
(Pamuk, 2001).  
Besides this, the government also began hiring mercenaries28 equipped with 
firearms in the form of sekban-sarıca and levend (Salzmann, 2004, p. 55). In the 16th 
century the population in the Mediterranean basin increased dramatically.29 A 
significant migration to urban areas accompanied by high unemployment forced many 
to enter the ranks of mercenaries (White, 2011, p. 262). These mercenaries were paid 
only during wartime. In peacetimes they were discharged, and either participated in the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
interest bearing bonds there. For further information about the Ferme Générale, see 
White 2004. 
25 Only the military revolution seems to have one-way relationship with the decline of 
tımar. The other events have a feed-back relationship, and there are debates about their 
effect on the decline of tımar. 
26 The process was not linear and the tımar system continued until the mid-19th century. 
27 Janissaries were salaried, standing infantry troops, under the direct command of the 
palace. 
28 Usage of the irregulars was not an invention of the late 16th century. The Ottomans 
had used them since their early campaigns in the 14th century. However, in this period 
the army became more dependent on the irregulars and in the second decade of the 17th 
century sekban and sarıca were incorporated into the regular army (Zens, 2011). 
29 White (2011) (using Barkan’s results through tahrir registers) shows that in many 
regions in Anatolia and the Balkans the urban population increased dramatically. The 
smallest percentage increase in the 1520-80 period was in Manastır/Bitola with 27% 
(among 12 cities). In Sarajevo this increase was 316% (p. 251). As we will see, Kayseri 
followed a similar pattern but in Manisa we do not observe such a great rise. 
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kapı30 of provincial governors, or became brigands and ravaged the countryside.31 The 
conflict resulting from the rebellions and banditry caused further migration into towns, 
so a vicious cycle was set up which lasted more than a century. The first target of the 
migrants was generally the closest cities. For example, there was a migration from 
Tokat to Erzurum, and from countryside neighborhoods to Kayseri. However, there 
were also migrations further west, from Karaman to Bursa. One of the most crowded 
migrant groups was non-Muslims. There was a great Armenian migration to the west in 
the late 16th and 17th centuries, and, along with the Perso-Ottoman wars, the conflicts in 
the countryside are mentioned as among the reasons of this migration (İnalcık, 1994, p. 
30; White, 2011, p. 255). 
Flight from the countryside because of rebellions and demobilized mercenaries 
not only undermined the tımar system (Salzmann, 2004) but also damaged tax 
sources.32 Despite all efforts by the government to force them back to their original 
regions, a great part of the immigrants did not return. White (2011) shows that even in 
1635 people who fled from Sivas did not return (p. 259). The greater part of the vacant 
farms, then, came to comprise the çiftlik (big-farm) of provincial notables in the next 
century. 
Because of the decline of the tax base, mainly because of devastating migration 
and rebellions, and the rise in soldiers’ pay, during the 17th century the government 
budget went into deficit. Especially during the War of the Holy League (1678-1699), 
excess demands forced an expansion of the economic claims on society. In 1695 an 
important fiscal institution, the malikane, was introduced to solve these fiscal problems. 
This system was similar to iltizam but the land was granted for not a short period but for 
a lifetime. At the beginning, 2 to 10 times the expected annual revenue was paid as 
muaccele (down payment), and, like the normal iltizam, a fixed (but higher than the 
                                                          
30 The kapı (or kapu) was the office of the governor but was more like a court. Kapı 
halkı (people belonging to the kapı) followed the officer if his place of duty changed. 
Kapulu levend were the mercenaries of governors (Somel, 2003, p. 148). 
31 These were not mutually exclusive. Many governors rebelled using the militia under 
their control (Pamuk, 2005, p. 141). 
32 A decree issued in 1567 points out that the flight harmed all the sipahi, the miri land, 
and the residents of the capital (White, 2011, p. 253). 
 
 
17 
 
iltizam) amount was paid annually.33 The main expected benefit of the new system was 
a more efficient usage of the mukataa. In the iltizam system, because there was no 
government monitoring, the mültezim were not investing in and exploiting the land as 
much as would have been possible. However, in the malikane system such exploitation 
was more difficult. Mültezim could rent out their mukataa for short periods, so the 
initial condition could be repeated. However, because the lease-holders (mütesellim or 
voyvoda) were often local agents who had an interest in keeping the mukataa for as long 
as possible, it can be claimed that the new system was more efficient, although it could 
not solve the fiscal problems. In the beginning, only the elites in the capital were able to 
have malikane, but over time various partnerships were founded in order to get access to 
them. After 1714, non-Muslims were normally prohibited from having most malikane 
(Salzmann, 1993, p. 403), while they could have mukataa. However, as sarraf,34 many 
non-Muslims played a very significant role in the distribution of malikane (Darling, 
2006). 
Partly as a result of the sultan’s need for popular support after the deposition of 
Mehmed IV, the target of fiscal demands/pressure also changed in this period (Darling, 
2006, p. 125), and tax from non-Muslims increased. In the first half of the 18th century, 
cizye35 income of the government quadrupled and yielded between 22% and 40% of the 
total direct taxes (Salzmann, 2004, p. 85). Therefore it can be claimed that the fiscal 
burden of non-Muslims increased, and thus that their wealth was suppressed in the first 
half of this century. However, there are also signs of a rise in non-Muslim wealth in the 
18th century. After the devastating war against Russia (1768-1774), the esham36 was 
introduced. In this system, mukataa were divided and sold to a large number of people. 
                                                          
33 For further information about the malikane system, see Genç 2000, pp. 99-152. 
34 The sarraf was a money-lender, banker, and/or money-changer. They had to obtain 
licenses, so their number was limited, and their role in the iltizam system was crucial. 
Any individual who wanted to obtain iltizam had to provide the guarantee of a sarraf 
(Kabadayı, 2008, p. 283).  
35 The cizye was the Islamic poll-tax collected from non-Muslims. There were two types 
of collection, as a lump sum (cizye ber vech-i maktu’) from a community and as wealth-
based per individual (cizye ’ala’l-ru’us). After 1691 the first of these was abolished, and 
cizye began to be collected from all non-Muslims per individual according to three 
wealth levels, poor, middle, and rich, the ratios of which were 1, 2, and 4 respectively. 
For a detailed account of the cizye, see İnalcık 1991b, pp. 562-566, and for the 
application of the new regulation of 1691 in Crete before 1691, see Sariyannis 2011.   
36 From the Arabic root sehm (share). 
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This time both non-Muslims and women could obtain the rights to a mukataa. This 
change may signify the increased wealth of these two groups, such that they were 
thought apt to participate in mukataa. It may in return have contributed to the wealth of 
non-Muslims and women, just as malikane contributed to the wealth of people who 
obtained them.   
The spread of both the iltizam and irregular soldiers, and the flight from rural 
areas, contributed to the rise of ayan in provinces.37 Ayan literally means “eyes” in 
Arabic, and denotes the notables, the respected and eminent people of a region. Their 
existence can be traced back to the formation phase of the empire: in some conquered 
regions there had already been notables who were then left intact by the Ottomans. In 
addition, to win the subjects over the side of the empire, some respected residents of the 
conquered regions were given fiefs, which remained in the possession of their (mostly 
Islamized) offspring in the subsequent centuries (Adanır, 2006). Starting from the 16th 
century the ayan were officially recognized by the central government. Being people 
who were well-informed about the region and respected by the residents, until the 18th 
century the ayan were intermediaries between the provincial government and the 
population (Pamuk, 2005, p. 142). Many imperial prescripts and decrees are addressing 
to these notables, referring to them as ayan, eşraf, ayan-ı vilayet, or ayan-ı memleket, 
along with the official governor in matters concerning the region. Through this 
intermediary role, they assisted officials, though without any official duty, on behalf of 
the community, in alleviating administrative problems38 (Neumann, 2006). While they 
were not necessarily drawn from the richest stratum and were mainly civil in the 
previous centuries, in the second half of the 18th century there arose ayan families which 
were among the richest in their region and who held official posts. And after 1770, 
ayanship became an office which was usually held by the most powerful, but had to 
have consent of all  (Yaycıoğlu 2008, pp. 121-4).  
One of the most important reasons for the rise of ayan was the authority gap in 
the provinces39 caused by the decline of the tımar system and the absence of governors 
                                                          
37 The title of the relevant chapter in McGowan 1994, “The Age of Ayans 1699-1812,” 
signifies the importance of the ayan in the 18th century. 
38 Kadı had to read edicts to people when ayan were there (Yaycıoğlu, 2008, p. 123).   
39 Probably because of this vacuum, the rise of the ayan was previously accepted by 
some scholars as a sign of decentralization (Akdağ, 1975). But in some recent literature 
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during long periods of war. Besides this, some governors themselves rebelled. In this 
period, the government demanded the help of ayan in provinces as militias against the 
rebels. In the course of time they became mütesellim.40 In 1726, the government stopped 
assigning governors to the provinces from the capital (Akdağ, 1975), and this opened a 
way to the position of governorship for the ayan (Pamuk, 2005, p. 40). Some of them 
also gained malikane in the 18th century (Findley, 2006), which, over time, and along 
with the governorship, came to constitute the backbone of their economic and 
administrative power (İnalcık, 1991a).  
Ayan equipped with the authority for tax-collection constituted an additional 
party which wanted a share from agricultural production. Besides this, they could 
collect the amount they spent on the region, or sent to the government (especially in 
wartime), from local people. This authority allowed them to overcharge (Faroqhi, 
2004a, p. 63), and to show their expenditures as higher than their real spending, thus 
further increasing the pressure on ordinary people. However, there was a check-balance 
system in place that was intended to reduce the risk. They could be sued and changed by 
the community if their misbehavior or incapability was observed or if undue pressure 
was felt by the locals.41 For the payment of ayan’s expenditures, local people had the 
power to assign share that each individual would pay (Yaycıoğlu, 2008, p.131), so they 
could arrange an optimal distribution for their society. Because ayan wanted to keep 
their authority, and posts such as the mütesellimlik, for as long as possible, and because 
their revenues from their posts were based mainly on the prosperity of their region, they 
often tried to improve their regions. However, this was only possible if there was no 
clash among the ayan, something which devastated rural areas in the first half of 18th 
century. 
In the Arab provinces and Anatolia (unlike in the Balkans), ayan could found 
dynasties whose power surpassed other families and so provided order in their region 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(e.g. Khoury 2006), ayan are accepted as the backbone of Ottoman hegemony in the 
provincial setting. 
40 As mentioned, the holders of mukataa were often residents of the capital. Mutesellim 
(or voyvoda) was the deputy for the governors/mültezim/muhassıl in their provinces who 
engaged in tax-farming. 
41 Yaycıoğlu (2008, pp. 135-6) shows how both Muslim and non-Muslim people of 
Ankara sued their ayan because of overcharging in 1770. 
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for a long time. In Western Anatolia such a dynasty was the Karaosmanoğulları, whose 
seat was in Manisa. In Kayseri in the 18th century there was no single great dynasty, but 
four competing ones, Kalaycıoğulları, Emiroğulları, Zennecioğulları, and 
Cabbarzadeler. We do not have enough information about possible effects of the 
Kayseri ayan on non-Muslims. However, there are some signs that in Manisa, the 
Karaosmanoğulları tried to suppress the wealth of other Muslim families. It may thus 
have contributed to the wealth of non-Muslims, or at least improved their economic 
position compared to Muslims. 
Along with fiscal and administrative institutions, some changes in economic 
structure were to be observed in the Ottoman provinces. Both domestic and foreign 
trade increased and underwent structural change. Regarding the empire’s foreign trade, 
shifts can according to McGowan be collected under three titles: “a shift in the content 
of the export trade, a shift in its geographic distribution, and a shift in the relative rank 
of the trading partners” (1994, p. 727). All of these had possible effects on ethno-
religious distribution of wealth in export cities, and thus in Manisa. 
Raw agricultural products came to replace manufactured goods and Iran silk in 
the export market (Panzac, 1992; Quataert, 2005, p. 128). In Macedonia and Western 
Anatolia, between 1720 and 1800, cotton cultivation, mainly for export, expanded three 
times. In addition to cotton, especially in the second half of 18th century, maize, 
tobacco, grapes, livestock and commercial fibers were exported at an increasing rate 
(Kasaba, 1988a, p. 19). The increased importance of home-grown Ottoman products 
helped the port cities like Izmir and Thessaloniki to develop. In the decades following 
the treaty of Passarowitz (1718), new trade routes in the Balkans supplemented the 
traditional arteries of the Levantine trade through the Mediterranean (Adanır, 2006, p. 
170, Katsiardi-Heiring, 2008; Seirinidou, 2008), and, in the literature, non-Muslims 
(especially Greeks) are often mentioned as among the main beneficiaries. In the second 
half of the century the Habsburgs were among the main importers of cotton from the 
Ottoman Empire through Macedonia and Izmir. Aside from the effects of Passarowitz, 
the foundation of the free ports of Trieste (1719) and Ancona helped the Habsburgs to 
become second after France in the share of the Ottoman exports in 1784. England 
ceased to be the Ottomans’ leading trade partner in the 1720s, after a determined and 
successful trade campaign by the French, which was relying on textiles better adapted to 
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the Levantine trade. But probably this was not main reason. Their interest in other 
regions (colonies) may have reduced England’s trade with the Ottomans. By 1784 it 
was fourth after the Dutch. The English, like the Dutch, became more dependent on 
trade intermediaries in this period, while the French continued to play directly and 
aggressively for approximately twenty years (McGowan, 1994, p. 728).42  
The existence of intermediaries between the Europeans and the local people was 
one of the most significant aspects of the Ottoman Empire’s international trade in the 
18th century. Foreigners needed native middlemen in order to access the interior. These 
intermediaries were almost exclusively recruited from among the non-Muslims of the 
empire, and they are claimed to be the main beneficiaries of the expanding commercial 
relations between the Ottoman Empire and the European countries. Masters (2001) 
shows that there was a great development of the local non-Muslims of Aleppo in the 
17th and 18th centuries, as translators and agents of the Europeans (ch. 3). According to 
Faroqhi (1997), religious ties were effective in shaping the relationship between the 
Europeans and the locals. She claims that Jews could not benefit from expanding 
European trade as much as Christians. She also mentions converts to Catholicism. 
Similar trends are also mentioned by Masters (2001, ch. 3); however, this does not mean 
that there was general comprador behavior among the non-Muslims. According to 
Kasaba (1988b) there were also conflicts between non-Muslims and Europeans in 
Western Anatolia. He claims that their intermediary position was not a source of their 
wealth but rather the result of a position gained in the regional networks over previous 
centuries (he uses the term “classical period”, so not only before the 19th but indeed 
before the 17th century). Indeed, over time the local non-Muslims undermined the 
Europeans. (It is likely that we cannot talk about the prior wealth of the Aleppine local 
non-Muslims in a similar way. Masters mentions reports of their poverty in the 
beginning of the 17th century.) Similarly, Kadı (2012) shows how in Ankara non-
Muslims penetrated the Dutch mohair trade in the 18th century.  
In the second half of the century, economic and political trends in Europe 
changed in important ways, generating a strong pull that primarily affected the western 
                                                          
42 Colbert (French Prime Minister in 1665-83) founded the “Jeunes de Langues” (Youth 
of Languages), and sent children to the Levant to learn languages when they were 6-10. 
He also founded a network of French merchants abroad, and relied on them rather than 
the intermediaries (Grenet, 2011). 
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provinces of the Ottoman Empire. In this period grain prices increased dramatically, as 
did the demand generated for goods by the newly developing industries of Europe. At 
the same time, the period was dominated by almost uninterrupted wars and revolutions, 
i.e. the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48), the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763), 
the American War of Independence (1775-82), and the French Revolution (1789). The 
American War of Independence increased the demand for Ottoman cotton. Similarly, 
the demand for wheat increased due to the French Revolution. This situation created an 
opportunity for contraband trade and speculative profiteering; and the profiteers were 
generally claimed to be Ottoman non-Muslims (Kasaba, 1988a, pp. 18, 19; McGowan, 
1981, p. 134). 
This period also saw the emergence of the Greek marine merchants. Although 
their existence can be traced back to the beginning of the 18th century 
(Papakonstantinou, 2010), the Mediterranean trade was dominated until 1720 by 
England, and between 1720 and 1740 by the French fleet. However, France had to 
withdraw from the Mediterranean due to wars and revolutions, and for the same reasons 
other European countries also withdrew from the region. The created a vacuum, 
especially in the Aegean Sea, which lasted until the end of Napoleonic Wars in 1815, 
and which was filled by the Greek marines (Issawi, 1982, p. 46; Kasaba, 1988a, p. 29).  
At the beginning of the 19th century, Izmir and Thessaloniki were reduced in 
importance as a cotton source (Issawi, 1982, p.121). With the Congress of Vienna 
(1815), two booms (grain and wheat) came to an end. American cotton again entered 
the market and gained dominance after a while. In addition, developments in 
transportation allowed the European merchants to penetrate the inner regions of the 
empire and form their own networks, so rendering intermediaries obsolete. However, 
this new condition only mildly shook the Ottoman non-Muslims. Their already 
established positions allowed them to resist the newcomers. In particular, as the 
Europeans gained economic ground, the Muslims were not the beneficiaries, and thus 
the economic superiority of non-Muslims over Muslims continued in the regions where 
this took place.  
We can conclude that, in the 18th century, trade with the European countries and 
the western regions of the Ottoman Empire increased—and especially so in the second 
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half of the century.43 The Habsburgs and France gained dominance in trade with the 
Ottoman Empire. Until the end of the century, the empire continued to be a net 
exporter,44 but the basket of exported goods changed. Instead of re-exportation, or the 
export of manufactured goods, the Ottoman Empire began exporting raw agricultural 
products such as cotton, tobacco, and maize. And the main beneficiaries of the process 
were non-Muslims, especially the Greeks in the western regions.  
Because it was not well documented we do not know very much about domestic 
trade. However it seems that domestic trade exceeded international trade until the 
demise of the empire. Panzac (1992) shows that domestic trade comprised more than 
three-fourths of the total merchandise along the Mediterranean ports in 1783. Besides 
this, less than 4% of the Ottoman population was clothed in French textiles in 1759. 
This means that not less than 80% were clothed via domestic production (Quataert, 
2005, pp. 128-129). Tabak (1988) claims that when Ottoman merchants found 
difficulties in competing with European merchants in maritime trade, they turned their 
faces towards the domestic trade of the vast imperial market. So the European pressure 
in international trade led to an increase in domestic trade, which was mainly carried out 
via caravans.  
The nature of the respective dominant group seems to comprise one of the main 
differences between domestic and international trade in the Ottoman Empire. Despite 
the fact that the share of non-Muslims increased in international trade, Muslim 
merchants continued to dominate the trade of interior towns and often between the 
interior and the port cities on the coast. Panzac (1992) points out that only a fifth of the 
captains in the Black Sea wheat trade were non-Muslim and that all merchants were 
Muslims until the late decades of the 18th century. In Erzurum there was no dominance 
in local trade in 1744. Based on customs registers, Erim (1991) shows that while 
Armenians were dominant in international trade, in local trade the Muslims had a 
similar share with them. Frangakis-Syrett (1985) claims that internal trade between 
                                                          
43 According to McGowan (1994) in the last decades of the century, the overall Ottoman 
trade was 290 million grams of silver and this was not higher than the previous century. 
However, one of the main sources of revenue for non-Muslims in the 18th century was 
contraband trade which is not reflected in this value (Kasaba 1988a, pp. 18-19). 
44 The empire was a net exporter to the whole of Europe, not to each country. The 
Ottomans were a net importer from France in the 18th century. 
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Izmir and the rest of the Ottoman Empire, both by land and by sea, was dominated by 
Muslim merchants.  
In conclusion, we can count three major changes in the empire which likely had 
differential effects on the wealth of Muslims and non-Muslims. Fiscal developments 
seem to have had effects which favored Muslims, at least in the beginning of the 18th 
century. Another important result of fiscal changes was administrative change, or more 
specifically the rise of the ayans in the provinces. We do not know the effect of this in 
Kayseri, but in Manisa it is likely that the dominant ayan family supported non-
Muslims more than Muslims. But probably one of the most important developments 
which could affect the wealth of two groups occurred in trade. Both domestic and 
international trade increased in the 18th century, and non-Muslims dominated 
international trade with the West while the importance of Muslims was maintained in 
domestic trade. Therefore it is to be expected that non-Muslims economically improved 
in the regions under the effect of European trade, while in the regions where domestic 
trade was more significant Muslims improved as well. 
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4. THE CITIES: MANISA & KAYSERI 
In this analysis we compare two cities, Manisa and Kayseri, the first of which 
was more open to foreign trade with Europe while the latter focused on domestic trade. 
As was mentioned above, European trade is claimed to have a positive effect on non-
Muslims. Similarly, improvement in domestic trade is expected to enhance the 
economic conditions of Muslims.   
In this section we offer an analysis of the cities, beginning with their historical 
developments since their conquest by the Ottoman Empire. Then we give information 
about population structure. Because we do not have sufficient data for populations in 
the 18th century, the populations of the previous and next centuries are offered to get 
idea for the 18th century. Lastly we describe the economic sectors, agriculture, industry, 
and trade in the cities.  
 
i) Manisa 
Manisa is a town in western Anatolia lying to the south of the Gediz River, and 
is separated from Izmir to the southwest by the calcic rocks of Manisa (Spilyos) 
Mountain.  
               i.a) A Historical Background 
The city had been under Ottoman control since 1410 as a kaza of Saruhan 
sancağı, which was a sancak of the Anadolu Eyaleti.45 Between 1437 and 1595 the city 
was governed by a şehzade (prince).46 This provided for the development of the city. 
The construction of mosques, medreses (schools),47 and palaces meant that there was an 
                                                          
45 The eyalet was a province, the sancak a sub-province, and the kaza a smaller region 
(city-like) under the legal and administrative jurisdiction of a kadı. 
46 There was no clear rule of succession in the empire. Şehzade were usually trained in a 
sancak as sancakbeyi before 1603. Along with Manisa, cities (sancak) such as Trabzon, 
Amasya, Antalya, Sivas, Kütahya, etc. were among the sancak chosen for training, and 
there was no clear ranking among these. After Selim II’s reign, Manisa became the 
realm of the heir apparent. 
47 Although there was no exact rule, they were used mainly for religious education. 
Somel (2003) mentions three levels of medrese. The initial level (hariç: outer) was 
dedicated to both religious and positive sciences. But the upper two levels are 
completely for religious/judicial education (p. 178). 
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active economic sphere (Matthews 2000, Uluçay 1939, p. 45). Also, when şehzade were 
the rulers, the resources of adjacent regions flowed into Manisa.48 In all likelihood, the 
enormous demand created by the palace also contributed to the economic development 
of the city overall. In addition, Manisa was exempted from certain taxes like the 
avarız.49 During the reign of Ahmed I (1603-1617), the tradition of training şehzade in 
the provinces was abandoned. Therefore, although the tax exemption privilege of 
Manisa continued for some decades in the 17th century, the city gradually lost its 
political importance and economic power (Uluçay, 1939, p.52). In this same period the 
neighboring port city, İzmir, was developing, and around the mid-17th century Manisa 
was overshadowed by İzmir.50 The importance of this process as related to the interests 
of non-Muslims was the right of exemption from taxes. Normally, tax-exempt status 
was held by Muslims; non-Muslims could not get tax-exemption easily unless they 
worked in certain sectors which provided for it, or for the government, or for a member 
of the dynasty.51 Therefore when the city lost its position as şehzade city, one source of 
tax-exemption and income for non-Muslims disappeared. Hence, the change may have 
had a deleterious effect on the economic conditions of non-Muslims.  
In 1627 the sancak became an arpalık,52 and rule of the mutesellim began 
(Emecen, 1997, p. 18; Goffman 1990, p. 82; Nagata, 1997, p. 23). Like almost all 
Anatolian cities, Manisa was affected by the Celali rebellions in the 17th and at the 
beginning of the 18th century. Even the town of Manisa, behind its wall, could not 
                                                          
48 Therefore the city functioned like a minor capital. According to Barkey (2008), 
Mustafa II’s decision to reside in Edirne reduced economic activity and livelihoods in 
Istanbul and this contributed to the 1703 Rebellion (p. 207). Probably the residence of a 
şehzade was more vital for the economy of Manisa. 
49 In 984 (M. 1577) Manisa was given the right of exemption from avarız by Murad III 
(Uluçay 1955, p. 98). 
50 This does not necessarily mean a decline in its economic situation or in urbanization 
relative to 16th-century Manisa, but merely a greater rise of Izmir as compared to 
Manisa. Matthews (2000) claims that Manisa surpassed its former economic condition 
in the mid-17th century. 
51  After 1691, the cizye exemption of some non-Muslims, except for the ones fighting 
for the empire, was also abolished (İnalcık, 1991b). 
52 Arpalık was an allowance, which could be in the form of the grant of fiefs, made to 
the principal civil, military, and religious officers of state, either in addition to their 
salary when in office, or as a pension on retirement, or as an indemnity for 
unemployment (Mantran, 1986, p. 658). 
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escape plundering in 1637 (Emecen, 1988). Because rural areas were unprotected, the 
rural economy was devastated. Peasants left their lands in large numbers and the urban 
population increased. Another source of the rise in the urban population was the 
migration of non-Muslims from the east of the empire, mainly Armenians, and for 
similar reasons. Therefore, in this period the population structure of the city changed in 
favor of non-Muslims, and specifically of Armenians.  
Another important event in the 17th century which affected non-Muslims (not 
only in Manisa, but throughout almost entire empire) was the Sabbatai Zevi movement 
(1626-1676).53 According to Sir Paul Rycaut, many Jews abandoned economic life 
because of this movement (cited in Stoianovich, 1960, p. 247). In addition, the 
movement shocked the center. Jews had been kept closer to the center than other non-
Muslims until this event took place; however, afterwards they gradually lost this 
position to the Greeks (Issawi, 1998). According to Stoianovich (1960), by 1750, it 
seemed that the Ottoman Jews had “truly fallen”.  
In the beginning of the 18th century certain rebellious movements continued 
around Manisa. The main reason for the revolts were stray levend who lost their kapu. 
The greatest leaders of the rebellions were Şer Himmet, Cin Halil, Balçovalı İbrahim, 
Küçük Emir and Gördesli Ali, and all of them were bölükbaşı, the leader of fifty levend 
in a kapu. After the mid-18th century, the Karaosmanoğulları began to control the city, 
and until the beginning of the 19th century no great uprisings are to be observed 
(Uluçay, 1955, pp. 76-78).   
The rule of the Karaosmanoğulları dynasty in Manisa, which continued until 
1813, began in 1743 when Karaosmanoğlu Hacı Mustafa Ağa was appointed as 
mütesellim of Saruhan. Like many other great ayan dynasties, the Karaosmanoğulları 
gained their power through the help they provided to the central government in the wars 
of the late 17th and early 18th century. After a struggle with other ayan families such as 
                                                          
53 In 1648, in Izmir, he claimed to be the Messiah, and maintained this claim until 1666, 
when he embraced Islam with many of his followers. We do not claim that all Jews 
followed him. However the movement had a negative effect on a greater number of 
Jews than simply his followers alone, because of the change in attitude by the 
government (increased suspicion). According to Stoianovich (1960), recently-arrived 
Jews of Portuguese and Livorno origins under the protection of France continued to 
perpetuate the earlier traditions of Jewish wealth and enterprise. 
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Araboğulları and Hacı Şabanoğulları around the 1770s they subdued their rivals and 
consolidated their power in the Manisa region as ayn’ül-ayan (notable of the notables) 
(Uluçay 1955, p. 17). Once there remained no great rival, there could be no clash of 
ayans which would (and in the first half of the century actually did) devastate the 
economy of the region (especially rural), and this relative peace contributed to the 
prosperity of the region54 through waqfs and trade.  
One of the significant aspects of the Karaosmanoğulları rule was their attitude 
towards non-Muslims, especially the Greeks. They welcomed them, especially those 
who had escaped from the Mora Revolt in 1770, and employed them in their great çiftlik 
(Nagata 1997, p. 22) and in domestic affairs (von Richter 1815). Their approach 
probably contributed towards the economic improvement of the non-Muslims. 
According to Nagata (1997) some of the non-Muslim shepherds and servants in the 
stockyards and çiftliks of the Karaosmanoğulları in the course of time became peasants 
(p. 179). After the revolt, the properties of those who were not forgiven were 
confiscated, and the property of a great part of the remainder was plundered by the 
Albanian mercenaries who had suppressed the revolt (Nagata, 1995, pp. 103-118). A 
great part of them therefore arrived in Manisa without any property. It is often accepted 
that until the end of the empire, peasants continued to enjoy freedom over their land, so 
they at least had control of a means of production. Hence, in comparison with their 
initial position, we may surmise that the economic conditions of at least the lowest 
segment of non-Muslims improved.55 Although we do not know how they behaved to 
local non-Muslims, we may reasonably claim that they preferred the economic 
development of non-Muslims over Muslims because of fear of Muslim rivals. It is likely 
that, just as the Ottoman dynasty tried to prevent local Muslim powers from rising, so 
did provincial notables in their own region. Although we do not know exactly how 
successful they were, there are signs of their successes. We see in the tereke records that 
the çiftlik of some Karaosmanoğlu members previously belonged to other ayan families, 
                                                          
54 Because they were living in the region, they could govern the region better than the 
central authority, and because they had hereditary-like control, they did not exploit the 
region uncontrolled. Also, they could sometimes resist the excessive demands of the 
central authority. 
55 Because our main aim is to observe whether non-Muslims showed greater economic 
improvment than Muslims, the attitude of the Karaosmanoğulları towards newcomers 
merely reduces a possible downward bias that would result on the wealth of non-
Muslims because of the migration. 
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such as the Seyfioğulları. And in the tereke of some of the leaders of Seyfioğulları we 
see that a great part of their property was bought by a Karaosmaoğlu under supervision 
of another Karaosmanoğlu (Telci, 2007). In this regard, Nagata (1997) also tends to 
accept the increase in the number of Muslims among the rich in the first decades of the 
19th century as a sign of demise of the Karaosmanoğulları (p. 179).  
 i.b) Population 
We do not have complete data about the population of the city, especially for the 
18th century. The first available set of population data is dated 1531. There were 1,396 
nefer (individual male) (1,258 hane (household), approximately 6,496 people).56 In 
1575 there were 1,995 nefer (1,530 hane, 8,245 people). The most crowded non-Muslim 
group in the 16th century was Jews with 8 hane (500 people) in 1531, and 117 hane (700 
people) in 1575. There was also small number of Greeks (7 hane, 22 hane, in 1531 and 
1575 respectively). There is no sign of the Armenians in this century (Behar, 1996, p. 
16; Emecen, 1988; Minorsky, 1986). Although Manisa was the greatest city of the 
Western Anatolia and still the last step before the throne, the rise of its population was 
modest compared to the general growth in the Mediterranean basin in the 16th century. 
This was probably because of migration to the newly flourishing port city, Izmir. The 
population of Izmir was 3,000 in 1570 and dramatically increased to 90,000 in the mid-
1600s (White 2011, p. 256). This means that some tens of thousands migrated to Izmir 
in this period, and among them there were probably people of Manisa origin. 
The population increased to approximately 18,000 (3,684 hane) in 1660. The 
proportion of non-Muslims in the city reduced in this century, but this was mainly due 
to the reduction of the Jewish population. The proportions of Armenians and Greeks 
increased, so the distribution of non-Muslim population also changed and Armenians 
became the most crowded non-Muslim group. There were 172 Armenian hane, 62 
Greek hane, and 73 Jewish hane, who were represented in two Armenian, one Greek, 
                                                          
56 Approximate populations are quoted from Behar (1996) who used Emecen’s “16. 
Asırda Manisa Kazası”. Nefer numbers are taken from Minorsky (1986), and hane 
numbers from Emecen (1988). Behar’s approximation mechanism is five times the hane 
number plus tax-exempt people. 
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and one Jewish mahalle57 (district) among total 52 mahalle. Because there were no non-
Muslim mahalle and just a small number of Greeks in the 16th century, we can assume 
that great part of Greeks and almost all Armenians migrated in the first half of the 17th 
century, probably because of the Celali rebellions (Emecen 1988). Nagata (1997) claims 
that the Armenian migration from Eastern Anatolia and Northern Iran also contributed 
to this rise in their share of the population, because of the development of Izmir as an 
export center for silk trade connected with Iran (p. 21). 
In the 18th century it seems that the population did not increase very much. Only 
two mahalle were added in this century and the population reached approximately 
20,000 to 24,000. The distribution of non-Muslims again changed in the second half of 
the century, mainly because of immigrants after the Mora revolt in 1770s.58 Jewish 
migration towards the centers of the expanding economies, Livorno, Trieste, Vienna, 
London, and Hamburg, also continued in this century (Stoianovich, 1960).  
There were 11,859 nefer in 1834. The non-Muslim population (3,658 nefer 
(31%)) consisted of 2,079 (17.5%) Greeks, 1,235 (10.5%) Armenians, and 344 (3%) 
Jews. Thus from the end of the 17th century to the beginning of the 19th the proportion 
of non-Muslims in the population increased from 10% to 30%.  
               i.c) Economy of Manisa 
The alluvial lands on which Manisa stands allowed agriculture to develop. 
Uluçay (1939) claims that the city was filled with vineyards, orchards, and vegetable 
gardens (p. 7). It is also evident that the city was active in grape (especially sultana) 
production (Goffman 1990, p. 80). Since the 16th century it had provided Istanbul with 
fruit (Goffman 1990, p. 34). In the 18th century, because of the loss of lands and 
                                                          
57 Names of mahalle related with a particular religion do not mean the existence of 
ghettos. Muslims could reside in non-Muslim mahalle and non-Muslims in Muslim 
mahalle. 
58 This event should have reduced the mean wealth of non-Muslims of Manisa, so 
causing a downward bias. After the revolt and its suppression, Mora was in a devastated 
economic condition. In fact, according to Zarinebaf (2005) Mora was already in a bad 
economic condition around 1725. Continuous wars with Venice (1668-1715) had 
damaged many properties. Beside, as was mentioned above, the migrants were 
generally used in the çiftlik of Karaosmanoğulları. That means that the 
Karaosmanoğulları had difficulty employing local people whether Muslim or non-
Muslim. So we can surmise that the newcomers found themselves in a more miserable 
condition than local non-Muslims. 
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disorder in Rumelia, where the main sources of Istanbul’s provisions were located, the 
burden in Western Anatolia increased. Therefore we may assume that it could not fully 
benefit from the increased European trade.59 However, commercial agriculture still 
developed in the city during the 18th century. The European demand for cotton and 
tobacco helped the city to flourish. 
Despite European pressure, the cotton textile industry continued to be the most 
important industry in the city and continued its development until the mid-18th century. 
Even at the end of the 19th century, 950 weaving looms were counted. One of the 
reasons for this vitality was the European market. Manisa cotton was low quality 
(Frangakis-Syrett, 1991, p. 98), so was not greatly demanded by the European upper 
class. However, the demands of the lower-middle class in Italy and Southern France 
increased in the 18th century. Manisa cotton fabrics were also preferred for clothing the 
plantations of European countries (Genç, 2000, p. 266, 268). Among the textile 
products, Manisa alacası was one of the most famous and had buyers in Istanbul and 
Anatolia throughout the 18th century.60 Dying was another important industry in the 
city. There were 22 dyer shops in the 18th century, mainly Muslims (Yıldız 2006, p. 86). 
There is also evidence of well-established woolen cloth production, although not as 
extensive as cotton clothing. Another important industry in Manisa was the tannery, 
which used raw material provided by the nomads around Gediz River (Emecen, 1988). 
The name Tabakhane Deresi (the River of Tanners) indicates how important this 
industry was for Manisa. 
Because of its position on the paths connecting Iran and inner parts of Anatolia 
to the coasts of Aegean Sea, Manisa was an active commercial center. Until the 17th 
century, when Izmir overshadowed it, Manisa continued its position as a trade hub of 
Western Anatolia (Goffman, 1990, p. 80; Nagata, 1997, p.11). The main commercial 
items in the city were agricultural products: cotton, tobacco, grapes, figs etc., and 
intermediate cotton products (Emecen, 1988). 
                                                          
59 Because of the system called miri mübaya’, Istanbul was buying at a lower price than 
the market price (Genç, 2000, p. 89). 
60 We can observe usage of Manisa alacasi in Kayseri through tereke records (Tok, 
1996, pp. 310-1). 
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It is accepted that Muslim, Italian and Jewish traders were active in the city trade 
in the 16th century. However, this changed in the 17th and 18th centuries, when 
Armenian and Greek merchants seem to replace the others (Minorsky, 1986).  
 
ii) Kayseri 
Kayseri is a city in the plain of the Karasu River, an affluent of the Kızılırmak, 
but just beyond the limits of the built-up area that begins the slopes of the Erciyes, an 
extinct volcano and the highest mountain of central Anatolia (3,916 m). 
                ii.a) A Historical Background 
Since the final decade of the 15th century, Kayseri had been under Ottoman rule 
as a sancak of the Karaman eyaleti. Its development was hindered for some decades in 
the 16th century, because of the continuous wars between the Ottomans and the 
Safavids. After the frontier was pushed towards the east during the reign of Selim I, the 
city actively became part of the Pax Ottomanica and flourished. Until the 18th century 
the Ottoman armies continued to pass through Kayseri during the Iranian Wars. In 1730 
Kayseri was among the nodes which supplied the army, and this situation continued 
until the end of the century, not only for the Iranian Wars but also for wars against 
Russia and Austria (Tok, 2009).61 In the beginning of the 17th century, like Manisa, it 
was shaken by the Celali rebellions. Jennings (1978) claims that these revolts led to 
rural decline, and he suggests three possible consequences: migration of the rural 
population to the town, the walls of which stood up against two Celali sieges; migration 
of those further east (which possibly included Armenians) to the city or countryside; or 
flight toward Istanbul and Rumelia. Kayseri seems to have recovered even by the 
middle of the century. When Evliya Çelebi visited the city in 1649, he found it 
prosperous, though no longer any more so than Sivas or Maraş (cited in İpşirli, 2002).  
                                                          
61 This situation had two contradictory effects. First, the increase in demand helped the 
economy of the city to improve. However, because the government was paying under 
the market price, the overall effect could have been negative. Also some men were 
recruited into the army with a salary (this was not necessarily valid only for eastern 
wars of the empire; for the War of Candia (in Crete), in 1669, many lağımcı were 
recruited from Kayseri). Since in pre-modern periods the economic equilibrium was 
generally very sensitive, a decrease of manpower in some (economic) sectors could be 
devastating (Genç, 2000, pp. 46-51). 
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During the 18th century, like Manisa, Kayseri passed into the control of the ayan. 
However, contrary to the dominance of one distinguished family (Karaosmanoğulları) 
in Manisa, four different families controlled Kayseri in the 18th century: the 
Kalaycıoğulları, Emiroğulları, Zennecioğulları, and Cabbarzadeler. From 1720-41 the 
Kalaycıoğulları were mutesellim of Kayseri, from 1741-62 the Zennecioğulları, and 
between 1775 and 1820 the Cabbarzadeler.62 Mutesellim status shows the strength of 
family in given period but was not the only source of power. Some decades after 1730s 
the Emiroğulları were struggling with the Kalaycıoğulları and Zennecioğulları. And the 
influence of the Zennecioğulları in the Sancak of Kayseri did not vanish with the rise of 
Cabbarzadeler, but continued until the centralist policies of Mahmud II (1808-1839) 
(Tok, 2009). It may be expected that their rivalry prevented the city from flourishing—
contrary to the order provided by Karaosmanoğulları in Manisa.  
               ii.b) Population 
Official population data about Kayseri are available only for the period 1500-
1583 and for 1813. It seems that unlike Manisa, Kayseri observed a rapid population 
increase, as did the Mediterranean basin in the same period. According to Jennings 
(1976), the population was 2,287 nefer (1,579 hane63) in 1500—326 (14%, 330 hane 
(20%)) of which was non-Muslim64 while 266 (82%) of the non-Muslims were 
Armenian. There then occurred a slow rise in population (3%) in the first quarter, 
followed by a rapid one (45%) in the second quarter of the 16th century. The rise of 
population was tremendous in the third quarter (134%), reaching 8,25165 nefer (6,015 
hane) in 1583—1,816 (22%) of which was non-Muslim, while 1,612 (89%) of non-
Muslims were Armenian. The rise of the non-Muslim population (457%, compared to 
228% for Muslims), and especially of Armenians (506%), was significant. It was one of 
the highest non-Muslim population growth rates for the cities which already had 
significant non-Muslim communities.66 While there were no mahalle for non-Muslims 
                                                          
62 These periods were not continuous and do not mean other families did not intervene, 
but just shows which family was most significant in a given period. 
63 We use Jennings 1976 for nefer numbers, and İpşirli 2002 for hane numbers. 
64 According to Jennings (1973), until mid-17th century there was no any sign of Jews. 
Therefore the non-Muslim population was composed of Armenian and Greeks.  
65 Jennings (1973) claims this is the highest number in Anatolia, after Bursa. 
66 Among the cities Jennings (1976) worked on, Karaman and Amasya observed a 
relatively slight rise (78%) in the non-Muslim population in the 16th century. In Trabzon 
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in 1500, there were fifty Muslim, thirteen Christian, and nine mixed mahalle in 1583. 
According to Jennings (1976), one of the reasons for the tremendous rise of the 
Armenian population was migration of Iranian Armenian traders, just as for Manisa in 
the next century. 
We do not have official population data for the subsequent two centuries. Tuş 
(1999) argues that the non-Muslim ratio in the kaza was approximately 30% in the first 
three decades of the 18th century. The 1831 census records that there were 13,466 nefer 
in the city. According to Behar (1996), in the sancak there were 38,965 Muslims and 
15,901 (29%) non-Muslims (p. 23). If we think that this resembles the ratio in kaza, we 
may claim that between the first three decades and the end of the 18th century there was 
no significant change in the religious distribution of the population. This also means 
that there is no bias that we need to consider, as we should for Manisa. 
                ii.c) Economy of Kayseri 
Although it cannot be claimed that agriculture was as productive in Kayseri as it 
was in Egypt or the irrigable parts of Syria, for a long time large numbers of townsmen 
in Kayseri had made a living by tilling the land, so grain production was significant 
(Faroqhi, 1987, p. 50, 216, Tok, 2009). Jennings (1997) also mentions “gardens of 
extraordinarily abundant vegetables and fruits”. They were probably at the regions of 
the city close to the Karasu River or its affluent. However, the existence of irrigation 
problems—although the city was founded on the plain of a river—and the unrest which 
resulted from the activities of aşiret and levend in the 18th century, can be counted 
among the factors that prevented an optimum level of agricultural production (Tok, 
2009). 
Cotton cloths were being produced in the city. Sheep and cattle were raised for 
pastırma and sausage, and for leather industries. These sectors were still active in the 
18th century. The main market for sausage and pastırma was the capital (Jennings 1997, 
Somuncu 2004). Although the dye house closed after the Celali rebellions and did not 
recover for a long time, dyeing was another important industry in the city (İpşirli 
                                                                                                                                                                          
they declined.  In Erzurum the number of non-Muslims increased but there were no 
non-Muslims at the beginning of the century. According to Behar (1996), the number of 
non-Muslim hane in Bayburt doubled, but the number of Muslim hane also doubled (p. 
13). 
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2002).67 There was also a well developed shoe-making industry in Kayseri. Tanning 
was also among the most significant industries, the importance of which can be 
understood from the existence of the Debbağin Mahallesi (Tanners District). Along with 
Konya and Diyarbakır, Kayseri was among the main centers of tanning. For Istanbul, 
sahtiyan (Morocco leather) was one of the most precious products of Kayseri tanners, 
and throughout the 18th and the 19th centuries decrees were regularly issued against the 
export of sahtiyan. Excess supply, after demand from Kayseri was fulfilled, was 
requested by Istanbul. However, as may be understood from the perpetuation of the 
decrees, the contraband trade in sahtiyan could not be prevented. In the 18th century this 
industry faced problems because mazı68 (quercus infectoria) was not coming regularly 
from Diyarbakır, so the price increased. The general insensitivity of the Capital towards 
the rise in input prices probably led to contraband trade (Karagöz, 2009; Tok, 2009). 
From the beginning of the 17th century to the mid-19th century many travelers 
mention extensive caravanserais, bedestens (covered bazaars), shops and bazaars69 in 
Kayseri. According to Paul Lucas, cotton bazaars were extensive in the first decades of 
the 18th century, and J. M. Kinneir defines the city as the trade emporium of Anatolia 
and Syria in the beginning of the 19th century (cited in Jennings, 1997). However, 
Faroqhi (1987) claims that because Kayseri was not on the main trade routes70 in 
Anatolia, its commercial activities remained at a local level, except for leather and 
cotton clothes, until the end of the 17th century.71 She mentions two secondary paths 
                                                          
67  Until the 1730s there was only one boyahane which was a malikane (Karagöz, 2009). 
68 Mazı was one of the most important inputs of sahtiyan production. 
69 Karagöz (2009) mentions the name of the bazaars she found in the sicils, which may 
indicate active economic sectors in the city in the 17th and 18th centuries; “At (horse) 
pazarı (market), araba (cart) pazarı, iplik (yarn) pazarı, koyun (sheep) pazarı, buğday 
(wheat) pazarı, debbağ (tanner) pazarı, penbeciler (a kind of fabric) pazarı, haffaf 
(shoe-maker) pazarı, saman (straw) pazarı, samurcular (weasel) pazarı, and pastırma 
pazarı.”  
70 Faroqhi (1987) mentions two trade routes in Anatolia. The first was “the northern 
caravan route” which connected Istanbul with Iran through Ankara, Tokat, Sivas, and 
Erzurum. “The diagonal route” passed through Istanbul, Aleppo, Damascus, and Cidde 
(p. 42). Pamuk (2007b) mentions another route which connects Tebriz with Konya, then 
goes to Alanya.  
71 Somuncu (2004) claims that, despite the fact that cotton clothes lost their importance 
for exports in the subsequent centuries, leather was still an important export item even 
in 1880. 
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which connect Kayseri with the main trade routes, the northern route to Sivas, and the 
diagonal route to Ereğli. There was also a commercial link with Ankara, an international 
commercial center of the time, but she does not think these secondary paths were active 
enough for international trade (pp. 41-43). Unlike Faroqhi, Pamuk (2007b) points that 
development of Iranian trade benefited Kayseri in the late 13th and 14th centuries. 
Therefore we may expect at least a sensibility towards developments as regards these 
routes. In addition, to provide income for the mosque and imaret he contructed in 
Nevşehir, İbrahim Paşa founded Vezir Hanı in Kayseri (Karagöz, 2009). Therefore it 
can be surmised that, even if not the trade emporium of Anatolia, Kayseri was at least 
an important business, commercial, and agricultural center, as pointed out by Jennings 
(1978). 
European trade seems limited, at least as regards imports. According to Faroqhi 
(1987), major European penetration occurred in the nineteenth century (p. 219). 
Although we do find some Londra çuka (woolen stuffs72) in the sicil of Kayseri 
(Karagöz, 2009), even around the mid-19th century the clothes of Kayseri people 
resembled classical ones (Ozturk, 2000). However, there was contraband trade. We can 
read the repeated decrees not to sell saltpeter to foreigners as a sign that this was indeed 
happening (Tok, 2009). Around the beginning of the 19th century certain raw 
agricultural products, like buckthorn and gallnut, were added to important export items 
(Jenning, 1997, Somuncu, 2004). 
It seems clear that Muslims were active in trade before the 18th century. 
According to Jennings (1976), in the 16th century, all mahalle, the names of which 
indicate their commercial activities, such as Eski Bezazistan (Old Covered Market), 
were almost completely Muslim. However, according to Mordtmann, around 1850 trade 
was completely in the hands of the local Cappadocian Christians (cited in Jennings 
1997). Therefore, signs of the ascendancy of non-Muslims can be expected in the 18th 
century, as was observed by Faroqhi (1987, p. 219) for the previous century.  
 
To sum up, both cities were founded on the slopes of a mountain and were close 
to valleys, so had agricultural surpluses, even if they were not among the most 
                                                          
72 They were not necessarily from London; woolen items were also produced in France. 
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important agricultural centers of the empire. Similarly, certain industries such as cotton 
and leather developed in both cities. Both Manisa and Kayseri were once trade hubs of 
their regions but later lost their commercial vitality. However, still of them both seem to 
have had an important level of trade in the 18th century. One of the main differences 
between these cities was the direction of their trade. Manisa developed as an export city 
for Europe, but the tüccar of Kayseri were more active in the domestic trade on Black 
Sea–Mediterranean line. Therefore, differences and changes in the wealth levels of 
Muslims and non-Muslims in both cities can be attributed to the direction of their trade.  
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5. Dataset: Tereke Records  
This study is based on information found in the tereke (probate inventories) in 
the court records of Manisa and Kayseri. A tereke is a document prepared by court 
officials after death or absence of a person. In case of death, government intervention 
was needed, irrespective of religious affiliation of deceased, to protect those in need, 
solve conflicts, or to get its own share. The existence of under-age heirs, including cases 
of pregnancy, or the absence of heirs, either because the deceased was in transit or the 
heirs were distant, necessitated government intervention. If the debt of deceased 
exceeded the value of the estate, or if there was a conflict over the estate among heirs 
and/or creditors, government was called upon for conflict resolution. In addition, if 
there was no heir of the deceased or existing heirs were to receive part of the estate (i.e. 
one spouse was the single heir), government would intervene to get its share (Gradeva, 
2005, p. 155; Matthews, 2000).73  
The records typically provide detailed information about the wealth possessed 
by an individual, comprising both tangible and intangible assets. Debts and money 
owed to the deceased were also included. Besides, especially in cases related to waqfs 
or manumission of slaves, provisos concerning the testament were included.74 Apart 
from wealth, the name of the heirs and their inheritance shares, family names (if extant), 
and titles (if possessed) which show social status were included (Cosgel & Ergene, 
2011; Faroqhi, 2004b, p. 56, 57).  
Table 1: Distribution of All Records Across Cities, Periods, Gender, Region, and 
Religion 
    Manisa Kayseri 
    Muslim non-Muslim Muslim non-Muslim 
    
1700-
1720 
1780-
1800 
1700-
1720 
1780-
1800 
1700-
1720 
1780-
1800 
1700-
1720 
1780-
1800 
Male 
Urban 146 259 15 33 30 146 15 16 
Rural 5 11 1 4 2 12 2 5 
Female 
Urban 56 117 2 4 8 36 3 1 
Rural 0 3 0 0 1 0 1 1 
                                                          
73 However, this does not mean in every case in which the abovementioned conditions 
were fulfilled, the kadı were involved. 
74 The value of a testament could not be more than one third of the total wealth left. 
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    As is clearly pointed out in almost all studies based on tereke records, these 
are characterized by certain limitations which prevent us drawing strong conclusions. 
First, they over-represent or under-represent certain parts of the society. Elders are 
expected to be overrepresented because of the higher death rate in old age. Women, 
rural populations, and non-Muslims are thought to be underrepresented.75 Therefore it is 
preferable to work with groups that are as homogenous as possible. In our dataset 
(Table 1) women and rural populations were small, especially for non-Muslims. Hence, 
to prevent possible biases because of different representation rates for these two groups 
between Muslims and non-Muslims, we excluded them from our dataset, and worked 
only with the urban male population. Because our main target is commercial activities, 
we think that this restriction will not affect our results in a way that was worse than their 
inclusion would.76 For keeping the records, the court received certain taxes and service 
fees. The marginal effect of these was probably higher for the poor, so it is expected 
that heirs of the poor preferred to solve the issue among themselves.  
Table 1: Distribution of Urban Male Population across Cities and Periods 
  Manisa Kayseri 
  1700-1720 1780-1800 1700-1720 1780-1800 
Muslim 146 259 30 146 
non-Muslim 15 33 15 16 
Share of non-
Muslims in the 
sample 9,32 11,30 33,33 9,87 
 
                                                          
75 Because we do not have other sources (except for some travel accounts) for the 
population in the 18th century, we do not know by how much non-Muslims are 
underrepresented. We have tried to estimate it via population values from before and 
after the 18th century. 
76 But we do not claim that rural people and women had no commercial interests. 
Jennings (1973) shows that almost all groups, independently of gender, religion, 
nobility, or region, had a commercial/mercantile mentality and a profit-seeking 
motivation in the first quarter of the 17th century. But, still, the inclusion of rural and 
female groups would cause problems because they are not equally distributed between 
the Muslim and non-Muslim subgroups. 
 
 
40 
 
 
As can be seen from Table 2, the share of non-Muslims in the data is close to 
their approximate share in the population in both cities. Because we do not know 
anything about the economic status of the deceased in their own community, we 
assumed that both Muslims and non-Muslims represent their communities with similar 
margin and direction of error in the beginning of the 18th century in both cities. When 
we compare this ratios with ratios mentioned for populations (see Section 3), in both 
cities non-Muslims seem to be under-represented at the end of the century. For Manisa, 
this can be related to the enduring reluctance of the newcomers from Mora to use the 
kadı court. We assume that the existence of newcomers in our dataset at the end of the 
18th century possibly causes a downward bias in the wealth of non-Muslims. Therefore 
we shall think about the results twice, first as downward biased and then as unbiased if 
necessary. Another possible reason would be the legal pluralism mentioned by Kuran 
(2004). Probability of the rich having a relationship with Europeans was higher. To 
benefit from legal pluralism, they had to be able to pay the price for the berat. 
Therefore, if non-Muslims began to apply to consular courts instead of kadı courts, and 
if this also applies to inheritance as well as economic disputes, we may, again, expect 
downward bias in the wealth of non-Muslims in the end of the 18th century. However, as 
was discussed above, in the 18th century this legal shift was not yet widespread. In 
addition, this European effect was not significant in Kayseri until mid-19th century. 
Another problem of the probate inventories is that we do not know the 
relationship between prices in inventories and real market prices unless it is explicitly 
declared that the properties were sold in auction (Canbakal, 2010; Cosgel & Ergene, 
2011; Faroqhi, 2003, p. 203; Faroqhi, 2004b, p. 57; Matthews, 2000). Because all items 
were second-hand, their valuation was difficult even with the best of intentions, and 
possible manipulations of the court officials makes the record yet more open to 
skepticism. Some small share of inheritance was given to court officials as wages. 
Therefore, to increase their incomes, court officials may have inflated appraisals, and 
because of the possible difference among motivations of different court officials there is 
a possibility of change in the real–observed price relationship over time. However, there 
is no reason to expect any difference in the attitudes of court officials towards different 
religious groups, or in different cities and periods. Therefore we may expect that wealth 
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of Muslims and non-Muslims is upward biased in both cities, and have no reason to 
assume different rates of bias. 
Finally, we cannot be sure if real wealth is registered in its totality. Heirs may 
have shared some part of the inheritance, and thus not put it before the kadı (Canbakal, 
2010; Matthews, 2000; Pamuk, 2007a). For example, Gradeva (2005) draws our 
attention to one person in Sofia whose wealth was at least 120,000 akçe, but whose 
tereke was less than 30,000 akçe (p. 162). Besides, according to Karababa (2012b), 
perishable items and entertainment expenses generally were not included in tereke. 
Through archeological investigations, Bedell (2000) claims that earthenware dishes, 
sewing gear and children toys were not included in the British probate inventories. 
Faroqhi’s (2004c) study of the Bursa record shows that we have similar problems with 
tereke records. As we do not have any idea about the real magnitude of 
underrepresented estates, this could be a serious problem. But, like overrepresentation 
due to court officials, we cannot claim any difference between religious groups, periods 
or cities, and can assume that the wealth of Muslims and non-Muslims is 
underrepresented with the same ratio. 
With these caveats in mind, tereke records constitute a unique data source 
concerning the economic conditions of common people in  the 18th century. 
We are trying to analyze changes in the economic activities of different groups. 
Therefore, as suggested by Faroqhi (2004c) and Gradeva (2005, p. 164), we use gross 
wealth, which represents economic power and the standard of life of the deceased better 
than net wealth.77 Net wealth would cause unrealized profits because of death, thus 
resulting in a downward bias to the economic condition of the deceased. 
To get real wealth we first changed all other monetary values to guruş. In the 
first period we accepted one guruş as equal to 120 akçe, and one para to three akçe. In 
the second period guruş had the same akçe value but 1 para was accepted as equal to 
                                                          
77 Gross wealth is total wealth of a deceased before debts subtracted. Net wealth is gross 
wealth minus debt. 
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2.8 akçe. After conversion of all values to guruş we use the price indexes in Pamuk 
(2004)78 with a base set of 1700. 
                                                          
78 Although we think that the index was probably different in Kayseri, we have used it 
because we do not have any other index for this city. However, we did not compare 
Kayseri and Manisa in one particular period. 
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6. Data Analysis 
In this section we try to analyze the wealth levels of both cities, as well as the 
subgroups therein. For wealth comparison, our main statistics are the mean, and five 
percentile values; p90 (90th percentile), p75 (75th percentile), median (50th percentile), 
p25 (25th percentile), and p10 (10th percentile). Beside the numerical presentation of 
these statistics, we sometimes offered box plots for visualization. Typically, in a box 
plot we can see all three quartiles, the first and third constituting a box and the median 
stays inside. There are also two whiskers, above and below. The one above is the largest 
value which is below 1.579 times the inter quartile range (IQR: 3rd quartile – 1st quartile) 
plus the third quartile, and the lower one is the smallest value which is above the first 
quartile minus 1.5 times IQR. All values which are not in between the two whiskers are 
called outliers. These outliers often led to misleading results as is shown below. 
Therefore sometimes we trimmed them and then repeated the procedure. 
As well as this we have tried to get a picture of levels of equality. To this end, 
the Gini coefficient, coefficient of variance (CV), and percentile ratios are presented.  
First, we tried to compare Manisa and Kayseri as a whole. The welfare of both 
cities seems to have increased in the 18th century, and a rise in inequality followed this 
development in both cities. If we do not consider outliers, one of which alone had 
around 70% of total wealth in Kayseri in the period of 1780-1800, wealth was more 
equally distributed in Kayseri than Manisa in both periods. However, the rise of Gini 
index was also more significant in Kayseri, standing at 26%80 as opposed to 13% in 
Manisa. 
Second, we compared the wealth of Muslims and non-Muslims in the two cities. 
In Manisa, the wealth of non-Muslims increased more than that of Muslims in the 18th 
century. While at the beginning non-Muslims and non-askeri Muslims had similar 
wealth levels, at the end of the century non-Muslims had more wealth. However, we 
still cannot claim that they had more wealth than askeri at the end of the century. 
                                                          
79 This “1.5” has no specific importance. We could change it, but there is no need for a 
different value. 
80 If we continue to consider abovementioned outlier, the Gini index almost doubles in 
Kayseri, from 0.46 to 0.88. 
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Then we focused on commercial activities. First we tried to count the number of 
people in commercial activities. Because we have only one tacir (merchant) in our data 
set, we had to add other occupations related to commerce. We also created some groups 
according to the estates left by the deceased. In Manisa, the interest of all groups in 
commercial activities seems to have increased. However, in Kayseri, bearing in mind 
that the size of the sample is very small, only the interest of Muslims has increased, 
while that of non-Muslims has decreased.  
Last, we added the size of commercial activities. In Manisa, as with the general 
wealth level, non-Muslims seem to have increased more than Muslims. In Kayseri, the 
opposite is true. But this time we have a problem with the size of sample in both cities. 
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i) General Wealth Distribution in Manisa and Kayseri 
 
It is generally accepted that the first half of the 18th century was a general 
recovery period for the empire, while the second half saw an economic decline 
following military defeats (Faroqhi, 1997; Khoury, 200681; McGowan, 1994; Neumann, 
2006). As can be seen in Table 3, both cities economically improved. In Manisa, except 
for the p10 of our sample, the wealth of all segments increased. In Kayseri there is a 
complete improvement with no exceptions.  
 
Table 3: Real Wealth (as guruş) in Manisa and Kayseri in both Periods 
 Manisa Kayseri 
 1700-20 1780-00 1700-20 1780-00 
Population 161 292 45 162 
Mean 761.08 1060.93 489.06 3014.83 
p90 1220.00 2473.77 1072.50 2239.44 
p75 516.00 795.07 702.00 997.18 
Median 200.00 284.05 381.50 399.89 
p25 93.50 104.23 155.95 197.54 
p10 51.10 49.30 99.50 129.51 
p90/p10 23.87 50.18 10.78 17.29 
p90/p50 6.10 8.71 2.81 5.60 
p50/p10 3.91 5.76 3.83 3.09 
p75/p25 5.52 7.63 4.50 5.05 
CV 2.96 2.43 0.95 8.94 
Gini Index 0.75 0.74 0.46 0.88 
 
However, in the box plot (Graph 1) we observe two outliers in Kayseri in the 
period of 1780-1800. We also have outliers in Manisa in both periods. When we drop 
these outliers, in order to see the common behavior, the results do not change too much. 
Still, except for p10 in Manisa, the welfare of all percentiles seems improved in the 18th 
century.  
One of the possible explanations for this observation is the nature of tereke 
records and our periodization. The decline mentioned above is often associated with the 
Russian War (1768-1774). In all likelihood, some of the people who died after 1780 
                                                          
81 Notably, Khoury (2006) mentions prosperity in Western Anatolia in the first half of 
the 18th century. 
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were economically active before the war. Therefore they represent not only the claimed 
period of decline, but also the growth period preceding it. Similarly, there must be many 
people who died between 1700 and 1720, but their wealth represents the negative 
effects of the War with the Holy League (1683-1699). 
Graph 1: Box plot for Wealth in Kayseri and Manisa 
(Real wealth as guruş in log10) 
 
Table 4: Real Wealth (as guruş) in Manisa and Kayseri in both Periods  
(Outliers trimmed) 
  Manisa Kayseri 
 1700-20 1780-00 1700-20 1780-00 
Population 156 289 45 160 
Mean 450.43 856.44 489.06 811.11 
p90 1023.50 2303.70 1072.50 2182.47 
p75 474.47 781.11 702.00 951.60 
Median 198.78 282.30 381.50 396.49 
p25 93.50 104.23 155.95 196.98 
p10 51.10 48.89 99.50 126.48 
p90/p10 20.03 47.12 10.78 17.26 
p90/p50 5.15 8.16 2.81 5.50 
p50/p10 3.89 5.77 3.83 3.13 
p75/p25 5.07 7.49 4.50 4.83 
CV 1.58 1.89 3.31 2.00 
Gini Index 0.62 0.70  0.46 0.58 
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The directions of the percentile values are also same for trimmed and untrimmed 
cases, for both cities. All segments diverge from each other in Manisa. The poor got 
poorer, and the rich got richer. However this situation was not reflected in the Gini 
indexes, and the reason for this is the outliers. Although all percentiles separated from 
each other, extreme values also disappeared, so, rather than a rise, a slight reduction in 
the Gini index is actually observed. When we trimmed the outliers, we observed a 13% 
rise in Gini index, from 0.62 to 0.7; and in Kayseri in the 18th century the Gini index 
increased by 26% even if we drop outliers at the end of the century. However, no 
process of complete dispersion is observed in Kayseri. The rich got richer at a greater 
rate; hence, inequality increased, but the welfare of the poor also increased and a greater 
share of the population below the median collected around the median, as can be seen 
from Graph 1.    
To sum up, both cities improved economically in the 18th century, while 
inequality increased in both. In Manisa, a greater share of the wealth was dispersed 
across a wider range at the end of the 18th century in comparison with the beginning. In 
Kayseri we also observe an improvement in the condition of the poor.  
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ii) Wealth Distributions of Muslims and non-Muslims in Manisa 
and Kayseri 
In this section we analyze the wealth levels of Muslims and non-Muslims in both 
cities, for two periods. In Manisa we observe a relative rise for the non-Muslims in the 
18th century. In Kayseri the opposite pattern is observed. We may, therefore, claim that 
the economic rise of non-Muslims did not hold in general terms across the whole 
empire, but only in some regions. In other parts of the empire, non-Muslims were 
among the losers of the dynamics at play in the 18th century.   
               ii.a) Manisa 
Table B182 shows that in Manisa non-Muslims seem to be less wealthy83 than 
Muslims at the beginning of the 18th century. The mean wealth of the non-Muslims is 
one third of the Muslims. Besides this, not only the median value but all the percentiles 
over the fifth percentile of the Muslims are higher than of the non-Muslims, which 
means that almost all segments of the Muslims were wealthier than the same segment of 
the non-Muslims. 
Quintile distributions show a similar situation.84 Although 9.32% of all the 
population was non-Muslim, they represent only 3.13% (1/32) of the top quintile, and 
15.15% (5/33) of the bottom quintile. Non-Muslims are almost equally distributed 
among the richer and poorer half (7 in the richer, 8 in the poorer), but, again, when we 
look at the quintiles, only 6.6% of them are in the top quintile while 33.3 are in the 
bottom.      
Although it had higher values for almost all percentile values, as can be seen in 
Graph C1,85 the wealth of Muslims was distributed in a more dispersed fashion. Not 
only the wealthiest,86 but also the least wealthy87 people were Muslim in the beginning 
                                                          
82 For tables of wealth distribution, see Appendix B.   
83 Except for Kayseri in the beginning of the 18th century, none of the mean differences 
in both cities in the three periods (Manisa 1700-1720, Manisa 1780-1800, Kayseri 
1780-1800) are statistically significant. In Kayseri, non-Muslim dominance in the 
beginning of the century is significant with 1%.  
84 See Appendix D for quintile distributions. 
85
  See Appendix C for box plots of wealth of sub-groups. 
86 The richest 14 people and 31 of the richest 32 people in the whole population are 
Muslim. 
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of the 18th century. Therefore, inequality among the Muslims was higher. Their Gini 
index was 0.75, while the Gini index of non-Muslims was 0.57. 
As was mentioned in the introduction, we divided Muslims in two groups: 
askeri, and non-askeri. It seems that in Manisa the askeri really did comprise an 
economically distinct group in the beginning of the 18th century. At the beginning of the 
century, nine of the fourteen wealthiest people were askeri while all three of the least 
wealthy were non-askeri. When we add askeri and non-askeri to our analysis 
separately, the difference between the non-Muslims and the (non-askeri) Muslims gets 
smaller, as can be observed both in Graph C2 and Table B1. But (non-askeri) Muslims 
still seem slightly wealthier, with higher mean and percentiles over the tenth. When we 
look only at the non-askeri population, the share of non-Muslims in the top quintile, 
despite still being smaller with 8.7%, gets close to the population value. Their 
distribution among the quintiles also changed positively. 26.6% is in the bottom, and 
13.3% is in the top quintile.  
Wealth distribution at the end of the 18th century is represented in Table B2. In 
this period, non-Muslims became wealthier than non-askeri Muslims in Manisa. The 
mean wealth of non-Muslims is one and a half times the mean of Muslims. However we 
cannot claim that non-Muslims were wealthier than Muslims. Although median and 
smaller percentiles of non-Muslims were higher than Muslims, the higher percentiles of 
Muslims, which are dominated by askeri, were bigger than for non-Muslims. 
Still, the share of non-Muslims in the top quintile is smaller than its share in the 
whole population. In the last period of the century, non-Muslims were 11.22% of the 
population, but 8.62% of the top quintile. The difference from the beginning of the 
century is in the bottom quintile. While their share in the bottom quintile was higher 
than their share in the population in the first period, it is lower in the last period. 8.47% 
of the lowest quintile is non-Muslim.  
If we compare only non-askeri and non-Muslims, mean of the non-Muslims is 
three times of the non-askeri Muslims. In addition, all percentile values of non-Muslims 
are higher. The share of non-Muslims in the top quintile of the non-askeri population is 
                                                                                                                                                                          
87 The poorest three people were Muslim and one of them, as Graph 2 shows, was an 
outlier among Muslims. 
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higher than its share in the wider non-askeri population, and in the bottom quintile it is 
lower. Their distribution among the quintiles shows a radical difference. 12.12% is in 
the bottom quintile, and 24.24% is in the top quintile; and as the quintile number 
increases, their share increases. Two thirds (22/33) of the non-Muslims in this period 
are among the richer half of the non-askeri population, while being equally distributed 
in the beginning. 
It seems that, as is pointed out in the literature, both non-Muslims and the askeri 
ascended economically in the second half of the 18th century, and the non-askeri—
despite real enrichment—fell behind these two groups. The rise of the non-Muslims was 
sharper than of the askeri.  
To sum up, in Manisa Muslims were relatively wealthier than non-Muslims and 
this situation was more significant for askeri Muslim. There was a small difference 
between non-askeri Muslim and non-Muslims in the beginning of the century. At the 
end of the 18th century we observe an improvement in the wealth of non-Muslims. For 
Muslims, the improvement was not as significant as for the non-Muslims and was not 
homogenous for all segments and subgroups. The poor Muslims got poorer in the 18th 
century.  
               ii.b) Kayseri 
In Kayseri the situation seems almost opposite. However, the sample size is very 
small for the period of 1700-1720: 15 non-Muslim and 30 Muslims. Therefore, none of 
our conclusions concerning Kayseri is strong as regards the beginning of the 18th 
century.  
In the beginning of the century non-Muslims seem richer than Muslims. Their 
mean wealth is two times higher than the mean wealth of Muslims, and all percentile 
values of non-Muslims are bigger than those of the Muslims. In this period the non-
Muslims constituted one third of the population, but represent two thirds of the top 
quintile,88 and one fifth of the bottom. 40% was in the top quintile of the whole 
population.  
                                                          
88 For quintile distribution, please see Appendix D. 
 
 
51 
 
Unlike Manisa, inequality in Kayseri was small in the beginning of the century 
and this was valid for both non-Muslims and Muslims. Non-Muslims had slightly 
higher inequality. The Gini index of non-Muslims was 0.43, and of Muslims it was 0.4. 
Another important difference between the two cities is that askeri and non-askeri 
show no great difference at the beginning of the century89 in Kayseri. Their box plots 
(Table C4) are almost the same. A difference only appears for the poorest and richest 
segments, where the whiskers of non-askeri are below the askeri’s whiskers. As can be 
seen in Table B3, not only the median but all percentile values between the ninetieth 
and the tenth are close.   
By the end of the 18th century, this situation had changed. During the century, all 
groups economically improved, but Muslims improved more, and, among Muslims, 
non-askeri improved even more. 
While their share in the population was 9.76%, they constituted only 3.13% of 
the top quintile. In addition, only 6.25% was in the top quintile. In this period, mean and 
inequality indexes do not mean a great deal because the richest person mentioned 
(Section 6i) had a great share of all the wealth. Still, because this person was an askeri, 
we can safely compare non-askeri Muslims and non-Muslims. Muslims seem wealthier 
at all percentile values. The share of non-Muslims in non-askeri population is 21% in 
this period, but they represent only 13.3% of the top quintile. Again, a great proportion 
of the non-Muslims are in lower quintiles. Only 12.3% of them are in the top quintile. 
To sum up, we observe two main developments in Kayseri during the 18th 
century. First, the non-Muslims became economically worse off. They not only fell 
behind the Muslims, but were impoverished in real terms. Their mean wealth reduced 
by one third. All percentile values are behind both their own values from the beginning 
of the century, and the values of the Muslims. Second, the askeri class dominated the 
city both numerically and economically. Although non-askeri improved more in the 
second half, the rise of the askeri in the first half was very significant. The reason for 
this may be the conflicts on the border with Iran in the first half of the century. Also, 
                                                          
89 According to Faroqhi (1987, p. 219), in the 17th century we cannot observe a 
difference between askeri/tax exempt and non-askeri townsmen. 
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askerization of non-askeri Muslims may have caused a decline in the gap in the second 
half of the century. 
During the century inequality for all three groups increased, but the rise for the 
non-Muslims was the slightest. The Gini index of the non-Muslims increased from 0.43 
to 0.51. For non-askeri Muslims, the Gini index doubled from 0.4 to 0.88. These values 
were more radical for askeri; from 0.4 to 0.91.  
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iii) Commercial Activities 
    To analyze the commercial activities of the Muslims and the non-Muslims we 
decomposed their wealth according to the factors which constitute that wealth. We have 
the values of houses, shops, commercial properties, monetary assets, real estate, 
livestock/animals, slaves and luxury items of each of the deceased. We defined seven 
groups of items as a sign of commercial activity. First is the occupation mentioned in 
the tereke. Because these groups were very small, we added shops. In the third step we 
added commercial properties. Because all commercial properties were not to sell, we 
accepted the smallest value as the subsistence level, and accepted, first, five times this 
level, then ten times the level, as a sign of commercial activity. We also created another 
group by considering a break in the levels of aggregate values of commercial estates left 
by the deceased. We observed no important difference between the results of breaking 
points. It seems that the share of non-Muslims in commercial activities increased in 
Manisa but did not become more than that of the Muslims. In Kayseri their share 
declined, while in the beginning they were very active.  
To be able to distinguish those who are involved in commercial activities, we 
first looked at their occupations. However, there are very few people who we could 
distinguish as tradesmen.90 As Table 5 shows, according to the mentioned occupations 
there were only five tradesmen in Manisa, which constituted 3% of the population in the 
beginning of the 18th century, and none of them was non-Muslim. The number increased 
to thirty five (12% of the population) by the end of the century, and seven of them were 
non-Muslim. Bearing in mind the lack of representativeness of this set, still we can 
draw insight concerning the increased interest of the non-Muslims of Manisa in 
commercial activities in the 18th century. At the end of the century 21.2% of the non-
Muslims were involved with commerce. Albeit at smaller rates, the percentages of non-
askeri and askeri Muslims in commercial activities also increased. The percentages of 
non-askeri Muslims in commercial activities increased from 2.8% to 13.4%, and that of 
askeri increased from 4.7% to 7.6%. Therefore we can also consider that there is a 
                                                          
90 By “tradesman” we do not mean merchant, which is “tacir” (plural tüccar) in 
Ottoman, and which occurs only once in our data set, but people whose occupation 
implies the possibility of commercial activity which is not restricted in its locality. To 
see all the occupations mentioned in our data set, and the ones accepted as commercial, 
see Appendix E. 
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correlation between the economic development of Manisa and its trade in the 18th 
century. 
    In Kayseri it is very difficult to draw conclusions because we could distinguish only 
one person who was non-Muslim involved in commercial activities at the beginning of 
the century, while there were four, three of whom were non-Muslim, by the end. 
Table 5: Tradesmen1 (According to Occupations)  
               1700-1720               1780-1800 
Commercial non-commercial91 Commercial non-commercial 
Manisa 
non-Muslim 
0 15 7 26 
non-Askeri 
3 101 19 122 
Askeri 
2 40 9 109 
Kayseri 
non-Muslim 
1 14 3 13 
non-Askeri 
0 18 1 60 
Askeri 
0 12 0 85 
 
Table 6: Tradesmen2 (According to Occupations & Shops) 
               1700-1720               1780-1800 
Commercial non-commercial Commercial non-commercial 
Manisa 
non-Muslim 
0 15 8 25 
non-Askeri 
6 98 22 119 
Askeri 
5 37 32 86 
Kayseri 
non-Muslim 
1 14 3 13 
non-Askeri 
0 18 2 59 
Askeri 
0 12 2 83 
 
    In the second step we added shops to our analysis.92 As can be seen from 
Table 6, despite some natural increase in the ratio of people engaged in commercial 
                                                          
91 By “non-commercial” we mean an occupation which could not be distinguished as 
commercial. 
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activities, the results do not change radically, especially at the beginning of the century. 
However, its effect on askeri is significant, especially at the end of the century in 
Manisa. Because of the significance of their military/administrative titles, the 
occupations of askeri are rarely mentioned in sicil. Through our new set we can observe 
a general increase in commercial interests in Manisa, and the rise of the non-Muslims is 
more significant than of the Muslims. For Kayseri it is still difficult to draw a 
conclusion, but there seems to be a general increase in commercial interests in this city.  
After shops, we also considered tools, but this did not add anything. 
 
Table 7: Tradesmen3 (According to Full Commercial Property)  
               1700-1720               1780-1800 
Commercial non-commercial Commercial non-commercial 
Manisa 
non-Muslim 
3 12 14 19 
non-Askeri 
47 57 92 49 
Askeri 
23 19 79 39 
Kayseri 
non-Muslim 
10 5 3 13 
non-Askeri 
7 11 21 40 
Askeri 
7 5 42 43 
 
    In the third step we added commercial estates into our analysis. First we counted all 
people who left any commercial estate as investors in commerce. Because the 
probability of being involved in commercial activities is higher for those whose 
occupation is mentioned, and who left commercially related shops, we add them to all 
three new groups after we analyzed them separately, and accepted these merged sets as 
a new set of people in commercial activities. Table 7 shows people who left commercial 
property. Partly because of its broadness, the percentages of people in commercial 
activities according to this definition are high. 45.3% of people in Manisa were in 
commercial activities at the beginning of the century, and this ratio increased to 63.3%. 
In Kayseri we observe a movement in the opposite direction. While 53.3% of residents 
                                                                                                                                                                          
92 For all the shops mentioned in the data and the ones accepted as related to 
commercial activities, see Appendix E. 
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of Kayseri were involved in commercial activity in the initial period, their ratio reduced 
to 40.7% in the later period. In Manisa, the rise is a general trend, but slightly more 
significant for the non-Muslims. The percentage of non-Muslims in commercial 
activities increased from 20% to 42.4%. The rise for the non-askeri was from 45.2% to 
65.2, and for the askeri from 54.7% to 66.9%. In Kayseri, the non-Muslims seem to be 
main reason for the decline in the rate of people involved in commercial activities. The 
percentage of non-Muslims in commercial activities in the beginning of the century was 
53.3%, and reduced to 18.7%. The change in non-askeri and askeri is small; from 38.8 
to 34.4 for the non-askeri, and from 58.3% to 49.4% for askeri. The general change for 
Muslims was only from 46.6% to 43.1%. When we merge this group with the previous 
two, according to occupations, and according to shops, and except for some numbers, 
there is no significant change related to the trends. But the significance of the rise of 
non-Muslims in Manisa becomes more explicit. 
Table 8: Tradesmen4 (According to Commercial Property-5* minimum)  
               1700-1720               1780-1800 
Commercial Non-commercial Commercial Non-commercial 
Manisa 
non-Muslim 
3 12 10 23 
non-Askeri 
45 59 77 64 
Askeri 
22 20 64 54 
Kayseri 
non-Muslim 
9 6 3 13 
non-Askeri 
4 14 16 45 
Askeri 
2 10 31 54 
 
    To narrow down our definition, we applied three restrictions. We can differentiate 
raw and processed commercial properties. Accepting the smallest values as subsistence 
level, and so not related with commerce, first we accepted over five times the minimum 
value as commercial material. In the second group we accepted ten times the minimum 
as commercial material. Our last definition, via commercial properties, comes from 
breaks in the levels of aggregate values of commercial estates left by the deceased. 
Table 8 shows the results for the initial restriction. For Manisa, the results are almost the 
same. The percentage of people in commercial activities increased for all groups, but 
with a higher rate for the non-Muslims. However, in Kayseri, despite the similarity in 
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the general ratio and of the non-Muslims, both of which declined, the direction of 
change for the Muslims is distinct from the result of all commercial property cases. The 
percentages of both askeri and non-askeri in commercial activities increased. Hence, 
this set implies a change in favor of the Muslims. When we add shops and occupations, 
as in all commercial property cases, the significance of the rise of the non-Muslim in 
Manisa and the Muslims in Kayseri increased, and in Kayseri we observe not a general 
decline but a slight general improvement from 33.3% to 34.5%. 
    Ten times the minimum gives similar results. As can be seen in Table 9, the 
percentage of all people in commercial activities increased from 43.4% to 50% in 
Manisa, but slightly reduced from 26.6% to 25.9% in Kayseri. In Kayseri a great 
decline in the percentage of the non-Muslims is the reason behind the general decline. 
The percentages of Muslims in commerce increased in this city from 10% to 27.4%. 
Adding shops and occupations did not change anything at the beginning of the century 
but increased the numbers in the end. Therefore, positive changes became more 
significant. As with five times the minimum case, in Kayseri we observe a positive 
general change when we add shops and occupations. 
Table 9: Tradesmen5 (According to Commercial Property-10* minimum)  
               1700-1720               1780-1800 
Commercial Non-commercial Commercial Non-commercial 
Manisa 
non-Muslim 
3 12 9 24 
non-Askeri 
45 59 73 68 
Askeri 
22 20 64 54 
Kayseri 
non-Muslim 
9 6 2 14 
non-Askeri 
1 17 14 47 
Askeri 
2 10 26 59 
 
    When we focus on the break points (Table 10), again like two cases above, we 
observe a rise in the commercial activities of all groups in Manisa, and therefore a 
general increase in commercial interests. In Kayseri the percentage of both askeri and 
non-askeri Muslims in commercial activities increased, but for the non-Muslims it 
reduces radically. This results in a slight general reduction. However, as in both cases 
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above, when we add shops and occupations in Kayseri also we observe a general 
increase in commercial activities; but reduction of the non-Muslim interest is robust. 
    We can conclude that for all three definitions of commercial activity, in Manisa the 
interest of all groups seems to have increased. In Kayseri, according to the three 
restricted versions of commercial activity definitions, there was a slight increase in 
interest for commercial activity. However, we observed a reduction in the commercial 
activities of non-Muslims. 
    
Table 10: Tradesmen6 (According to Commercial Property-break) 
               1700-1720               1780-1800 
Commercial Non-
commercial 
Commercial Non-
commercial 
Manisa 
non-
Muslim 
3 12 10 23 
non-Askeri 
42 62 81 60 
Askeri 
20 22 69 49 
Kayseri 
non-
Muslim 
9 6 3 13 
non-Askeri 
5 13 20 41 
Askeri 
4 8 39 46 
 
 We observed very slight changes in Manisa in the 18th century. In Kayseri, the 
interest of non-Muslims in commercial activities declined, and that of the non-askeri 
Muslims increased. For askeri Muslims we observed a slight decline. Therefore we can 
conclude that the improvement of non-Muslims in 18th-century Manisa was not 
completely related to their extra-visibility in commercial sphere. The commercial 
interests of all groups increased, and although the rise of the non-Muslims was more 
significant, the non-Muslims had a still smaller share in commercial activities. In 
Kayseri, as with their overall wealth, the commercial interest of the non-Muslims 
declined while that of both Muslim groups increased, if we focus on commercial 
properties left. 
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iv) Size in Commercial Activities 
 
In this section we compare the size of three groups in commercial activities 
in the 18th century. We have very small sets for non-Muslims in Manisa at the 
beginning of the century, and in Kayseri at the end. Bearing this constraint in mind, 
it seems that the rise of non-Muslims was related to improvements in the size of 
their commercial activities in Manisa. In Kayseri, apart from decline in interest, we 
observe a decline in the size of commercial activities. 
In Manisa, at the beginning of the 18th century and as shown before, there were 
only three non-Muslims who left commercial estates. A comparison would therefore 
be problematic, but still we may claim that they had no great commercial property in 
contrast with the Muslims. The greatest among the non-Muslims (with 17.6 guruş) 
was almost half of the median of the Muslims (30.5 guruş, 28.5 guruş for non-
askeri).  
At the end of the century we observe a rise in all groups, as in the case of total 
wealth. Again the rise of the non-Muslims is more significant than others, but still 
they were behind the askeri. While non-Muslims had smaller wealth levels than 
non-askeri Muslims at the beginning of the century, they had more by the end. We 
can conclude that the commerce of non-Muslims increased in Manisa in the 18th 
century not through their spread in the commercial sphere but through an increase in 
their size. 
Table 11: Commercial Property Distribution in Manisa in 1780-1800  
  non-Muslim Muslim non-Askeri Muslim Askeri Muslim 
Population 14 171 92 79 
Mean 152.71 152.87 107.01 206.27 
Standard Deviation 195.14 261.32 194.76 314.97 
Coefficient of variance  1.28 1.71 1.82 1.53 
Mean/Median 2.50 3.44 2.89 2.86 
p90 492.96 460.39 390.37 570.42 
p75 271.60 164.94 97.26 227.16 
p50 60.99 44.44 37.03 72.18 
p25 17.61 14.96 14.61 14.96 
p10 3.70 5.28 4.32 5.93 
p90/p10 133.23 87.20 90.36 42.50 
p90/p50 8.08 10.36 10.54 13.54 
p50/p10 16.48 8.42 8.57 3.14 
p75/p25 15.42 11.03 6.66 7.29 
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Table 12: Commercial Property Distribution in Kayseri in 1700-1720 
  non-Muslim Muslim non-Askeri Muslim Askeri Muslim 
Population 10 14 7 7 
Mean 324.07 52.73 76.06 29.39 
Standard Deviation 195.14 96.59 134.78 27.90 
Coefficient of variance  0.60 1.83 1.77 0.95 
Mean/Median 1.57 2.11 2.54 1.33 
p90 926.75 75.00 380.00 75.00 
p75 369.50 48.50 48.50 61.67 
p50 206.31 24.94 30.00 22.02 
p25 66.08 10.57 16.00 5.72 
p10 49.25 5.73 2.20 5.72 
p90/p10 18.82 13.09 172.73 13.11 
p90/p50 4.49 3.01 12.67 3.41 
p50/p10 4.19 4.35 13.64 3.85 
p75/p25 5.59 4.59 3.03 10.78 
 
In Kayseri, at the beginning of the 18th century, the 90th percentile of the 
Muslims had less than half of the median of the non-Muslims. Only one (non-
askeri) Muslim had property more than the 75th percentile of the non-Muslims, 
while one (askeri) had more than the 25th percentile, and the others were below. 
Therefore we can conclude that the size for the non-Muslims was bigger than that 
for the Muslims at the beginning. 
By the end of the century, as with Manisa at the beginning, we have only three 
non-Muslims who left commercial properties.93 The greatest among them was 
around the median of the Muslims. Therefore we can conclude that in Kayseri, both 
the visibility and the size of the non-Muslims declined in the 18th century. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
93 They left 28.17, 30.86, and 83.98 guruş. 
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7. Conclusion 
In this thesis we used tereke records to try to observe changes in wealth 
distribution for three groups in Kayseri and Manisa in the 18th century. In this period, 
three institutional changes occurred which could have affected wealth and the ethno-
religious wealth distribution; fiscal, administrative, and economic. Fiscal institutions 
were likely to affect non-Muslims negatively, increasing the burden on them. The 
administrative change was rise of ayan. The effect of this change was unclear but could 
have been positive for non-Muslims relative to non-askeri Muslims in Manisa. Lastly, 
both domestic and international trade expanded in this century. An important share of 
the literature claims that there is a positive correlation between the wealth of non-
Muslims and the expansion of European trade. In domestic trade, Muslims are accepted 
as being the dominant group. Therefore any comparative rise of non-Muslim wealth 
over Muslim wealth in Manisa can be attributed to either the rise of the ayans or an 
expansion of the European trade. Similarly, in Kayseri we can relate the rise of Muslim 
wealth with the rise in domestic trade, and possibly with the rise of the ayans. 
Our first observation about wealth in these cities supports the general claim 
about recovery in the 18th century, at least until the war with Russia (1768-1774). Both 
cities economically improved in this century.  
After examining the general economic conditions of these cities, we focused on 
the religious distribution of wealth. The wealth of non-Muslims may be downward 
biased in the late 18th century, because of migration from Mora and/or legal pluralism in 
Manisa. However, non-Muslims still seem to be improved relative to Muslims, 
especially compared to non-askeri Muslims, in the 18th century.  
In Kayseri, we observed a decline of the non-Muslims relative to the Muslims. 
These results indicate a positive correlation between relationships with the Europeans 
and the economic conditions of non-Muslims. We might also think that, as Frangakis-
Syrett (1985) has commented, non-Muslim merchant networks did not operate inside 
Anatolia, but only between Europe and the coastal cities and their hinterlands. We 
should also reject the assumption of a general economic rise of non-Muslims in the 18th 
century. In Kayseri, that ascendance needs to be related with developments in the 19th 
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century, most probably the penetration of European powers into central Anatolia after 
mid-19th-century developments in transportation.  
Alongside wealth levels, we tried to compare commercial activities. First we 
asked if a greater part of the non-Muslims were interested in commercial activities at 
the end of the century. In Manisa we could not observe a great relative change. At the 
end of the century, a still smaller share of the non-Muslims were engaged in commercial 
activities. In Kayseri, their share in commercial activities declined, while there was no 
great change in the share of the Muslims. Then we looked at their size in commercial 
activities. In Manisa, as with the general wealth level, non-Muslims improved. In 
Kayseri, again, we observed decline. Because we have very small data sets it is difficult 
to draw strong conclusions, but still we may accept the result at least as supportive of 
the idea that non-Muslims played a more active role in the commercial relations with 
Europeans. 
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Appendix A: Askeri 
Canbakal (2007) gives following list based on an order issued in 1628 which 
was still effective in the end of the 17th century (p. 65):  
a) all those who received stipends (vazìfe) no less than an akçe and a half, 
including preachers, prayer-leaders, scribes, waqf trustees, revenue collectors (cabi) and 
overseers (nazır), shaikhs, people who recited the Quran or read prayers in return for a 
stipend, and those who disposed of income from waqfs, mezra'as, dervish con-vents and 
the like; 
b) semi-professional auxiliary troops; 
c) descendants of the Prophet (sadat); 
d) those who provided special services to the government, such as falcon-
raisers, mountain pass guards, bridge-keepers, messengers, share-croppers on state land, 
rice cultivators, salt producers, sheep and cattle dealers, copper miners (bakırcı), deputy 
judges, and city wardens; and 
e) those who were exempt (mu'àf ) from royal taxes (tekàlif-i 'örfiyye). 
Following this list and Cosgel & Ergene (2008) the titles we accepted as askeri 
are seyyid and şerifs as sadat (descendands of the Prophet), ağa, beşe, bey, and çavuş as 
seyfiyye (men of sword), and efendi, çelebi, molla, dede, dervis, hoca, and halife as 
ilmiyye (religious class).  
Occupations accepted as askeri are; Askeri, Bakırcı, Barutcu, Bayrakdar, Çavuş, 
Çeribaşı, Dersiam, Fenerci, İmam, Katip, Kethuda, Mühürdar, Mültezim, Mütesellim, 
Odabaşı, Serdengeçti, Sipahi, Solak, Sultaniye Hatibi, Vakıf katibi, Yazıcı, Yeniçeri, 
Zuema/Zaim.
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APPENDIX B: Tables for Wealth Distributions in Both Cities, Manisa & Kayseri 
 
Table B1: Wealth Distribution in Manisa in 1700-1720  
  non-Muslim Muslim non-Askeri  M. Askeri Muslim 
Population 15 146 102 44 
Mean 271.80 811.35 364.90 1846.28 
Standard Deviation 355.67 2359.16 493.64 4077.58 
Coefficient of variance  1.31 2.91 1.35 2.21 
Mean/Median 1.90 4.00 2.05 5.59 
p90 664.32 1345.18 982.82 4475.77 
p75 348.02 583.26 406.00 920.68 
Median 142.80 202.62 178.27 330.56 
p25 57.27 105.30 70.93 126.21 
p10 20.56 52.86 50.26 105.30 
p90/p10 32.31 25.45 19.55 42.50 
p90/p50 4.65 6.64 5.51 13.54 
p50/p10 6.95 3.83 3.55 3.14 
p75/p25 6.08 5.54 5.72 7.29 
Gini Index 0.57 0.75 0.58 0.77 
 
Table B2: Wealth Distribution in Manisa in 1780-1800  
  non-Muslim Muslim non-Askeri M. Askeri Muslim 
Population 33 259 141 118 
Mean 1496.37 1005.44 486.94 1625.01 
Standard Deviation 4198.90 2302.67 1061.02 3103.87 
Coefficient of variance  2.81 2.29 2.18 1.91 
Mean/Median 3.91 3.56 2.36 3.96 
p90 2303.70 2477.53 1017.04 4305.56 
p75 639.75 797.53 430.49 1813.21 
p50 383.10 282.30 206.54 410.25 
p25 130.86 100.00 87.85 120.27 
p10 69.63 48.89 47.56 56.42 
p90/p10 33.09 50.68 21.38 76.31 
p90/p50 6.01 8.78 4.92 10.50 
p50/p10 5.50 5.77 4.34 7.27 
p75/p25 4.89 7.98 4.90 15.08 
Gini Index 0.78 0.73 0.65 0.71 
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Table B3: Wealth Distribution in Kayseri in 1700-1720  
  non-Muslim Muslim non-Askeri M. Askeri Muslim 
Population 15 30 18 12 
Mean 757.41 354.88 342.78 373.04 
Standard Deviation 643.84 265.52 244.68 304.54 
Coefficient of variance  0.85 0.75 0.71 0.82 
Mean/Median 1.22 1.37 1.24 1.56 
p90 1,436.30 751.13 757.00 745.25 
p75 1,072.50 502.00 472.32 510.47 
p50 622.47 259.46 277.46 239.63 
p25 204.41 151.10 154.25 149.34 
p10 124.00 84.53 77.00 115.64 
p90/p10 11.58 8.89 9.83 6.44 
p90/p50 2.31 2.90 2.73 3.11 
p50/p10 5.02 3.07 3.60 2.07 
p75/p25 5.25 3.32 3.06 3.42 
Gini Index 0.43 0.4 0.39 0.4 
 
 
Table B4: Wealth Distribution in Kayseri in 1780-1800  
  non-Muslim Muslim non-Askeri M. Askeri Muslim 
Population 16 146 60 86 
Mean 508.53 3,289.49 815.80 5015.32 
Standard Deviation 565.66 28,384.28 1442.41 36953.98 
Coefficient of variance  1.11 8.63 1.77 7.36822 
Mean/Median 1.81 8.10 2.56 11.61357 
p90 1,173.09 2,441.55 1996.91 2441.55 
p75 688.17 1,013.73 951.60 1086.97 
p50 280.56 406.17 318.25 431.85 
p25 146.65 197.78 166.05 236.79 
p10 80.28 133.46 113.05 149.14 
p90/p10 14.61 18.29 17.66 16.37 
p90/p50 4.18 6.01 6.27 5.65 
p50/p10 3.49 3.04 2.82 2.90 
p75/p25 4.69 5.13 5.73 4.59 
Gini Index 0.51 0.88 0.62 0.91 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 
 
Appendix C: Box plots for Wealth in both Cities: Manisa & Kayseri 
Graph C1: Box plots for real wealth of Muslims and non-Muslims in Manisa 
 
Graph C2: Box plots for real wealth of askeri and non-askeri Muslims and non-
Muslims in Manisa 
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Graph C3: Box plots for real wealth of Muslims and non-Muslims in Kayseri 
 
Graph C4: Box plots for real wealth of askeri and non-askeri Muslims and non-
Muslims in Kayseri 
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Appendix D: Muslims and Non-Muslims in Quintiles 
 
Manisa 1700-All Population 
                  
Quintile 
Muslim non-Muslim non-Muslim in 
Q. 
Q. in non-
Muslim 
1 28 5 15.15 33.33 
2 29 3 9.38 20.00 
3 30 2 6.25 13.33 
4 28 4 12.50 26.66 
5 31 1 3.13 6.66 
                    Total 146 15 9.32                      
 
 
Manisa 1700-Askeri Subtracted 
                  
Quintile 
Muslim non-Muslim non-Muslim in 
Q. 
Q. in non-
Muslim 
1 20 4 16.67 26.66 
2 20 3 13.04 20.00 
3 21 3 12.50 20.00 
4 20 3 13.04 20.00 
5 21 2 8.70 13.33 
                    Total 102 15 12.82  
 
 
Manisa 1780-All Population 
                  
Quintile 
Muslim non-Muslim non-Muslim in 
Q. 
Q. in non-
Muslim 
1 54 5 8.47 20.84 
2 54 4 6.90 20.84 
3 51 8 13.56 19.69 
4 47 11 18.97 18.14 
5 53 5 8.62 20.46 
Total 259 33 11.30                     
 
 
Manisa 1780-Askeri Subtracted 
                  
Quintile 
Muslim non-Muslim non-Muslim in 
Q. 
Q. in non-
Muslim 
1 31 4 11.43 12.12 
2 30 5 14.29 15.15 
3 28 7 20.00 21.21 
4 26 9 25.71 27.27 
5 26 8 23.53 24.24 
                  Total 141 33 18.97  
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Kayseri 1700-All Population 
                  
Quintile 
Muslim non-Muslim non-Muslim in 
Q. 
Q. in non-
Muslim 
1 7 2 22.22 13.33 
2 7 2 22.22 13.33 
3 8 1 11.11 6.66 
4 5 4 44.44 26.66 
5 3 6 66.67 40.00 
                  Total 30 15 33.33                
 
 
Kayseri 1700-Askeri Subtracted 
                  
Quintile 
Muslim Nonmuslim Nonmuslim in 
Q. 
Q. in 
Nonmuslim 
1 5 2 28.57 13.33 
2 4 3 42.86 20.00 
3 5 1 16.67 6.66 
4 4 3 42.86 20.00 
5 0 6 100.00 40.00 
                  Total 18 15 45.45             
 
 
 
 
Kayseri 1780-All Population 
                  
Quintile 
Muslim Nonmuslim Nonmuslim in 
Q. 
Q. in 
Nonmuslim 
1 28 5 15.15 31.25 
2 29 3 9.38 18.75 
3 31 2 6.06 12.5 
4 27 5 15.63 31.25 
5 31 1 3.13 6.25 
                  Total 146 16 9.88  
 
 
 
Kayseri 1780-Askeri Subtracted 
                  
Quintile 
Muslim Nonmuslim Nonmuslim in 
Q. 
Q. in 
Nonmuslim 
1 12 4 25.00 25 
2 12 3 20.00 18.75 
3 12 3 20.00 18.75 
4 11 4 26.67 25 
5 13 2 13.33 12.5 
Total 60 16 21.05  
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Appendix E: Occupations 
In the following classification we benefited from Faroqhi (2009), Göçek (2000), 
Matthews (2000) and Kadi (2007). Where there is a conflict in their classification it is 
mentioned. Note that the two groups do not have to be exclusive. One can be both 
producer and seller, as is the case today. 
Craftsmen:  
Abacı, Ayakkabıcı (shoe maker), Babuçcu (shoe maker), Berber (barber), Boyacı 
(dyer), Börekçi (pastry makers), Camcı (glass maker), Cullah (weaver), 
Çanak/Çömlekçi (potter), Çıkrıkçı (winder), Çizmeci (boot maker), Çulha (broadcloth 
maker), Debbağ (tanner), Değirmenci (miller), Demirci (ironmonger), Etmekçi (baker), 
Fesçi (fez maker), Gazzaz (silk manufacturer), Haffaf (shoe maker), Helvacı (Halva 
maker), Kasab (butcher), Keçeci (felt maker), Kilimci (carpet maker), Nalbant 
(blacksmith), Nalçacı (blacksmith), Saatçi (clock maker), Sabancı (plough maker), 
Sarraf, Semerci (packsaddle makers), Serraç (saddle maker), Takyeci (hat maker), Terzi 
(tailor), Yapağıcı (sword maker), Yorgancı (blanket makers), Zıbıncı (babygro maker)  
Tradesmen:  
Attar (herbal shop), bezzaz (fabric merchant), çamaşırcı (cloth merchant), deveci 
(cameleer), eskici (old clothes man), yemişçi (fruit seller), kürkçü (fur seller), kuyumcu 
(goldsmith), kömürcü (coal seller), saatçi (clock maker), sarraf (banker), iplikçi (thread 
seller), tacir (merchant), çekirdekçi (cotton seed seller), leblebici (roasted chick pea 
seller), tiftikçi (mohair seller), katırcı (muleteer), mintancı (chainse seller), macuncu 
(paste seller), mısırcı (corn seller), urgancı (rope seller). 
Shops accepted as commercial: 
Bakkal (store), bezzaz (fabric seller), kavuk (quilted turban), mağaza (store), 
kuyumcu (goldsmith) 
Tools accepted as commercial: 
Bakkal (store), bezzaz (fabric seller), kavuk (quilted turban), mağaza (store), 
kuyumcu (goldsmith) 
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